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Abstract. In many tasks related to reasoning about consequences of a logical theory, it is de-
sirable to decompose the theory into a number of weakly-related or independent components.
However, a theory may represent knowledge that is subject to change, as a result of execut-
ing actions that have effects on some of the initial properties mentioned in the theory. Having
once computed a decomposition of a theory, it is advantageous to know whether a decomposi-
tion has to be computed again in the newly-changed theory (obtained from taking into account
changes resulting from execution of an action). In the paper, we address this problem in the
scope of the situation calculus, where a change of an initial theory is related to the notion of
progression. Progression provides a form of forward reasoning; it relies on forgetting values of
those properties, which are subject to change, and computing new values for them. We consider
decomposability and inseparability, two component properties known from the literature, and
contribute by 1) studying the conditions when these properties are preserved and 2) when they
are lost wrt progression and the related operation of forgetting. To show the latter, we demon-
strate the boundaries using a number of negative examples. To show the former, we identify
cases when these properties are preserved under forgetting and progression of initial theories
in local-effect basic action theories of the situation calculus. Our paper contributes to bridging
two different communities in Knowledge Representation, namely research on modularity and
research on reasoning about actions.
1 Introduction
Modularity of theories has been established as an important research topic in knowledge rep-
resentation. It includes both theoretical and practical aspects of modularity of theories formulated
in different logical languages (L), ranging from weak (but practical) description logics (DLs) such
as EL and DL-Lite to more expressive logics [13,15,17,18,38,47], to cite a few. Surprisingly, this
research topic is little explored in the context of reasoning about actions. More specifically, it is
natural to decompose a large heterogeneous theory covering several loosely-coupled application do-
mains into components that have little or no intersection in terms of signatures. Potentially, such
decomposition can facilitate solving the projection problem, which requires answering whether a
given logical formula is true after executing a sequence of actions (events). In cases, when a query is
a logical formula composed from symbols occurring in only one of the components, the query can
be answered more easily than in the case when the whole theory is required. This decomposition
can help in solving other reasoning problems (e.g. planning or high-level program execution) that
require a solution to the projection problem as a prerequisite. To the best of our knowledge, the only
previous work that explored decomposition of logical theories for the purposes of solving the projec-
tion problem are the papers [1,2]. These papers investigate decomposition in the situation calculus
[34,43], a well-known logical formalism for representation of actions and their effects. The author
proposed reasoning procedures for a situation calculus theory by dividing the whole theory syntacti-
cally into weakly-related partitions. Specifically, he developed algorithms that use local computation
inside syntactically-identified partitions and message passing between partitions. We take a differ-
ent approach in our paper: instead of decomposing the whole action theory into subsets, as in [1,2],
we consider signature decompositions of an initial theory only. Our components are not necessarily
syntactic subsets of the initial theory. We concentrate on foundations, and explore properties of com-
ponents produced by our decomposition. Whenever possible, we try to formulate these properties in
a general logical language L, that is a fragment of second order logic; however, when necessary, we
focus on a specific logic.
This paper considers the decomposability and inseparability properties of logical theories. These
properties are well known in research on modularization in the area of knowledge representation
[17,38,18,32], but have not been studied previously in the scope of the situation calculus. Both prop-
erties are concerned with subdividing theories into components to facilitate reasoning. Informally,
decomposability of a theory means that the theory can be equivalently represented as a union of two
(or several) theories sharing a given set (∆) of signature symbols. Inseparability of theories wrt some
signature∆ means that the theories have the same set of logical consequences in the signature∆. If
a theory (T ) is∆–decomposable into∆–inseparable components, then (under certain restrictions on
the underlying logic) each component of the decomposition contains all information from T in its
own signature. This is an ideal case of decomposition, since in this case the problem of entailment
from T can be reduced to entailment from components, which are potentially smaller than the theory
T .
In the area of reasoning about actions, an initial logical theory represents knowledge that is
subject to change due to the effects of actions on some of the properties mentioned in the theory.
It can be updated with new information caused by actions, while some other knowledge should be
forgotten, as it is no longer true in the next situation. We consider two types of update operators: 1)
forgetting in arbitrary theories and 2) progression of theories in the situation calculus. Forgetting is
a well-known operation on theories first introduced by Fangzhen Lin and Ray Reiter in their seminal
paper [25]. Forgetting a signature σ in a theory T means obtaining a theory indistinguishable from
T in the rest of the signature symbols sig (T )\σ. In this sense, forgetting a signature is close to the
well-known notion of uniform interpolation. Forgetting a ground atom P (t¯) in a theory T results in
a theory that implies all the consequences of T “modulo” the truth value of P (t¯). The operation of
forgetting is closely related to progression in basic action theories in the situation calculus.
The situation calculus [43] is a knowledge representation logical formalism, which has been
designed for axiomatization of problems in planning and high-level program execution. The idea
is to 1) axiomatize a set of initial states (as an initial theory), 2) axiomatize preconditions telling
when actions can be performed, and then 3) add the axioms about the effects of actions on situation-
dependent properties. After these steps, one can reason about the consequences of sequences of
actions to determine whether properties of interest hold in a given situation resulting from execut-
ing a sequence of actions and whether a certain sequence of actions is consecutively executable. In
the situation calculus, the so-called basic action theories represent such axiomatizations [43]. Each
basic action theory contains an initial theory that represents incomplete knowledge about an initial
situation S0. In a special case, when there is complete knowledge about a finite number of indi-
viduals having unique names, the initial theory can be implemented as a relational database [43,8].
Roughly, a basic action theory D is a union of an initial theory DS0 with some theory T , defining
transitions among situations, and a set of “canonical” axioms assumed to be true for all application
problems represented in the situation calculus. Informally speaking, an update of the initial theory
after execution of an action is called “progression of the initial theory wrt an action”. More precisely,
progression of DS0 wrt some action α is a logical consequence of D which contains all information
from D about the situation resulting from the execution of α in the situation S0. Ideally, it is com-
puted as updating DS0 with some logical consequences of T , once all information in DS0 , which
is no longer true in the resulting situation, has been forgotten. Progression is important for practical
agents with indefinite horizon since progression is the only feasible way of maintaining knowledge
about the world. Exploiting modularity in the vast agent’s knowledge is important to guarantee that
progression of the agent’s knowledge will be computationally feasible.
Historically, the “situation calculus” (earlier referred to as “situational logic”) is the earliest log-
ical framework developed in the area of artificial intelligence (AI). Having been developed in the
1960s by John McCarthy and his colleagues [33,34,14], it is one of the most popular logical frame-
works for reasoning about actions; it is presented in most well-known textbooks on AI. It is worth
mentioning that there are both conceptual and technical differences between the situation calculus,
designed for reasoning about arbitrary actions, and the Floyd–Hoare logic, Dijkstra’s predicate trans-
formers, and dynamic logic, and other related formalisms, which have been developed for reasoning
about the correctness of computer programs. For example, the latter category of formalisms would
consider the operator assigning a new value to a variable in a program as a primitive action, while
the former would consider as primitive the actions on higher level of abstraction, such as moving
a book from its current location to the table. For this reason, the situation calculus is chosen as
foundation for high-level programming languages in cognitive robotics [22]. In our paper, when we
refer to the “situation calculus”, we are following the axiomatic approach and notation proposed by
R.Reiter [43] who developed a general approach to axiomatizing direct effects and non-effects of
actions. It has been observed for a long time that in practical applications, real-world actions have
no effect on most properties. However, it was Reiter who first proposed an elegant axiomatization
that represents compactly non-effects of actions. Reiter’s book covers several extensions of the sit-
uation calculus to reasoning about concurrent actions, instantaneous actions, processes extended in
time, interaction between action and knowledge, stochastic actions, as well as high-level program-
ming languages based on the situation calculus. In our paper, we will focus on the cases of situation
calculus when actions are sequential, atemporal, and deterministic. Despite this focus, our results
can be subsequently adapted to characterize more general classes of actions. The main limitation of
our work is in concentrating on direct effects only. Indirect effects of actions are beyond the scope
of the present study and will be considered in future work.
In this paper, we are interested in the case when the initial theory is decomposed into inseparable
components, studying which conditions guarantee preservation of decomposability and inseparabil-
ity of components after forgetting or progression. We would like to avoid recomputing a decom-
position of an updated initial theory after executing an action. Moreover, we would like to know
whether the components remain inseparable after progression. Such invariance of decomposability
and inseparability wrt progression is important since progression may continue indefinitely as long
as new actions are being executed. If decomposability and inseparability are always preserved, then
it would suffice to compute a decomposition of the initial theory once – this decomposition will
remain “stable" after progression wrt any arbitrary sequence of actions. Additionally, if an executed
action has effects only on one component of the initial theory, then we would like to be able to com-
pute progression using only this part instead of the whole initial theory. This leads to the question of
when the decomposability and inseparability properties are preserved under progression and under
forgetting. To answer this question we have to better understand the properties of these two opera-
tions. In our study, for brevity, when we refer to “decomposability” and “inseparability” properties
of components, we will use the phrase component properties.
This paper contributes to the general understanding of forgetting and progression in the literature,
since new results on them are needed for the purposes of our investigation.Not surprisingly, both for-
getting and progression have intricate interactions with properties of decomposed components. We
will demonstrate that, in general, it is very difficult to guarantee the preservation of decomposability
and inseparability, because there is a certain conceptual distance between these notions on one hand,
and forgetting and progression on the other – we provide examples witnessing this. Nevertheless,
we will identify cases when these properties remain invariant. Our results show that some of these
cases have a practically important formulation. An important contribution of the paper is in formu-
lating clear negative examples that demonstrate cases when decomposability and inseparability are
lost under progression. Thus, the paper contributes to understanding the limits of the component
approach based on these properties. In particular, our examples demonstrate that there is little hope
to preserve inseparability if the different components share a fluent. Decomposability turns out to be
also a fragile property that can be easily lost after executing just one action in a simple basic action
theory. Overall, this paper contributes by advancing the study of forgetting and progression, and also
by carrying out a thorough and comprehensive study of when decomposability and inseparability are
preserved and when they are lost.
We start in Section 2 by introducing basic notations and then provide a survey on decompos-
ability and inseparability, the two component properties of theories considered in this paper. Then in
Section 3 we introduce the basics of the situation calculus, proceeding to the component properties
of forgetting in Section 3 and progression in Section 4. The last section, Section 5, includes a sum-
mary of the obtained results. A preliminary shorter version of this paper (without proofs) appeared
in the proceedings of AAAI-13 conference [40]. This extended version of our paper includes new
results not mentioned in the conference version as well as proofs and a detailed backgroundmaterial
and discussion of previously published results about forgetting and progression, in order to make
this paper self-contained.
2 Background
2.1 Conventions and Notations
Let L be a logic (possibly many-sorted), which is a fragment (a set of sentences) of second-order
logic (either by syntax or by translation of formulas), and has the standard model-theoretic Tarskian
semantics. We call the signature a subset of non-logical symbols of L (and treat equality as a logical
symbol). IfM1 andM2 are two many–sorted structures and ∆ is a signature then we say thatM1
and M2 agree on ∆ if they have the same domains for each sort and the same interpretation of
every symbol from∆. IfM is a structure and σ is a subset of predicate and function symbols from
M, then we denote by M|σ the reduct of M to σ, i.e., the structure with predicate and function
names from σ, where every symbol of σ names the same entity as inM. The structureM is called
expansion of M|σ . For a set of formulas T in L, we denote by sig (T ) the signature of T , i.e.
the set of all non-logical symbols which occur in T . We will use the same notation sig (ϕ) for the
signature of a formula ϕ in L. If t is a term in the logic L then the same notation sig (t) will be
used for the set of all non-logical symbols occurring in t. Throughout this paper, we use the notion
of theory as a synonym for a set of formulas in L, which are sentences when translated into second-
order logic. Whenever we mention a set of formulas, it is assumed that this set is in L, if the context
is not specified. For two theories, T1 and T2, the notation T1 ≡ T2 will be the abbreviation for the
semantic equivalence. If T is a set of formulas in L and ∆ is a signature, then Cons (T , ∆) will
denote the set of semantic consequences of T (in L) in the signature ∆, i.e. Cons (T , ∆) = {ϕ ∈
L | T |= ϕ and sig (ϕ) ⊆ ∆}. We emphasize that this is a notation for a set of formulas in L,
because T may semantically entail formulas that are outside of L.
2.2 Basic Facts about Decomposability and Inseparability
In the area of theory modularization, a module (or component) is usually understood as a set of
theory consequences that satisfy certain properties. The latter are determined by requirements to a
module in the context of application. Some approaches follow the idea that a module should be a
syntactic subset of the axioms of a given theory. For instance, a theory can be partitioned into sub-
sets of axioms meeting certain requirements of balance among the partition. Thereafter, reasoning
wrt the initial theory can be reduced to reasoning within the obtained components via a message
passing algorithm, which communicates between the partitions to find information needed to answer
a query [3]. As a rule, the information to be communicated relates to the signatures shared between
the partitions. The advantage of this approach is that the partitioning algorithm can be relatively
simple and rely on syntactic analysis of theory axioms, thereby circumventing semantics. On the
other hand, it may not be possible to eliminate some dependences between the partitions, if they
are induced by syntactic form of the axioms. For instance, if a theory T consists of the axioms
{∀x P (x), ∀x (P (x) ↔ Q(x))}, then it may not be possible to infer that it can be represented as
the union of two components {∀xP (x)} and {∀xQ(x)}, which do not share any signature symbols.
In other words, a theory with syntactic dependencies may have an axiomatization that yields a par-
titioning into components, which either do not have symbols in common, or in a more general case,
share a fixed signature (given as a parameter of decomposition).
In our paper, we adopt the following notion that was introduced in [38] and applied to the study
of modularity in [17].
Definition 2.1 (∆–decomposability property) Let T be a theory in L and∆ ⊆ sig (T ) a subsig-
nature. We call T ∆–decomposable, if there are theories T1 and T2 in L such that
– sig (T1) ∩ sig (T2) = ∆, but sig (T1) 6= ∆ 6= sig (T2);
– sig (T1) ∪ sig (T2) = sig (T );
– T ≡ T1 ∪ T2.
The pair 〈T1, T2〉 is called ∆–decomposition of T and the theories T1 and T2 are called ∆–
decomposition components of T . We will sometimes omit the word “decomposition" and call the
sets T1 and T2 simply components of T , when the signature ∆ is clear from the context. The sets
sig (T1) \∆ and sig (T2) \∆ are called signature (∆–decomposition) components of T .
The notion of∆–decomposition is defined using a pair of theories, but it can be easily extended
to the case of a family of theories. It is important to realize that T1 and T2 are not necessarily subsets
of axioms of T in the above definition. We only require that T ≡ T1 ∪ T2. Clearly, if L satisfies
compactness and T is a finite ∆–decomposable theory in L for a signature ∆, then there is a ∆–
decomposition 〈T1, T2〉 of T , where T1 and T2 are finite.
Note that the axioms of theory T given beforeDefinition 2.1 can not be (syntactically) partitioned
into subsets having no signature symbols in common. However T has a different axiomatization
given by ∀xP (x) and ∀xQ(x) and hence, is ∅-decomposable. Thus, in general ∆-decomposition
can be finer than a syntactic partitioning based on a particular axiomatization of a theory.
According to the definition of decomposability, computing a decomposition means finding an-
other (equivalent) representation of a theory, which defines the required components. This means that
a decomposition procedure must employ logical reasoning. Therefore, potentially it is more compu-
tationally complex than syntactic partitioning, which splits a theory into syntactic subsets of ax-
ioms. However, the research on algorithmic properties of decomposability (see e.g., [39,9,17,35,38])
shows that deciding whether a theory is ∆-decomposable turns out to be not harder than deciding
the entailment in the underlying logic. Studying the complexity of decomposability in different log-
ics is an ongoing research topic. An algorithm for computing decomposition components can be
obtained, e.g., from a procedure of computing uniform interpolants (if the logic enjoys efficient uni-
form interpolation, see Proposition 2 in [38] and [35]), or by applying the technique of eliminating
non-∆-symbols from the axioms of a theory. The technique is described in [17] for the logics EL
and DL-Lite, which is further studied in [41] and can be extended to more expressive Description
Logics. Using any form of equivalent rewriting means that the obtained axiomatization may be of
a size larger than the set of axioms of the original theory. In particular, finding a decomposition
may imply computing explicit definitions, in which case the size of the components depends on the
complexity of such definitions in the underlying logic. For instance, a decomposition component
may be of size exponentially larger than the original theory, which is evidenced by Example 28 in
[17]. It is known that in general there is no upper bound on the complexity of explicit definitions
in first-order logic [11,36] and computing them is usually harder than entailment in FOL fragments
(see e.g. [44]). On the other hand, one can take control over the growth of the component sizes by
carefully choosing which signature ∆ can be shared between the components. Using Example 28
from [17], for instance, it possible to describe a situation when tuning up ∆ can exponentially re-
duce the component sizes. In general however, this question motivates research on the succinctness
of explicit definitions and uniform interpolants in different logics.
An important requirement often considered in the literature is that a module must contain all
information about a signature of interest∆, which is typically a subset of the signature of the module.
In other words, it is required that a module must entail the same consequences in signature ∆, as
the source theory. Having fixed a signature ∆, the ability to see differences between two theories
strongly depends on the logic being used as “lens” for their examination: the more expressive power
the logic employed has, the more differences it is possible to see. Probably the most powerful tool in
measuring similarity of theories is the language of second-order logic. If two theories have the same
sets of second-order consequences in a signature∆, then the classes of reducts of their models onto
∆ coincide, i.e. both theories “define” the same semantics for ∆-symbols. Keeping in mind that a
module is usually understood as a set of consequences of a source theory, it is important to note the
following model-theoretic fact, which will be helpful for grasping the results of this paper. It says
that if a logic L is weaker than second-order, then in general, a set of consequences of a theory T in
L may not be able to capture the intended semantics of symbols from a subsignature ∆, as defined
by T .
Fact 2.2 If T is a theory in L and ∆ a signature, then some models of Cons (T , ∆) may not have
an expansion to a model of T .
Indeed, let L be first-order logic and {P, f} be a signature, where P is a unary predicate and
f is a unary function. Let T be a theory saying that f is a bijection between the interpretation of
P and its complement. Thus, T axiomatizes the class of models, where the interpretation of P and
its complement are of the same cardinality. LetM be a model from this class and let N be a model
of the same signature {P} in which the interpretation of P is a countable set, but the complement
is uncountable. The modelsM and N are elementary equivalent, i.e., no formula in signature {P}
can distinguish between these two models. For instance, this can be shown by using the fact (e.g.,
see [10]) that every sentence in signature {P} is equivalent to a boolean combination of formulas
∃>mP and ∃>m¬P , where an integerm > 0, which mean “P (respectively, ¬P ) holds on at least
m distinct elements”. Therefore,N is a model of Cons (T , {P}), but clearly, it has no expansion to
a model of T .
As will be noted in Section 3, forgetting is an operation, which gives a set of (second-order)
consequences axiomatizing the same class of models, as the original theory, modulo forgotten sig-
nature/ground atom.
It is known that in general, a set of consequences of a theory may not be finitely axiomatizable
in the logic, in which the theory is formulated. For instance, the following example is widely known
in the literature on Description Logics (e.g., see Section 3.2 in [31]).
Fact 2.3 If T is a theory inL and∆ a signature, then Cons (T , ∆)may not be finitely axiomatizable
in L.
Let T be the first-order theory axiomatized by the following two axioms:
∀x [A(x) → B(x) ]
∀x [B(x) → ∃y(R(x, y) ∧B(y)) ]
Consider the signature ∆ = {A,R}. Then it is not hard to verify that Cons (T , ∆) is equivalent to
the following infinite set of formulas:
∀xA(x) → ∃yR(x, y)
∀xA(x) → ∃y∃u[R(x, y) ∧R(y, u) ]
∀xA(x) → ∃y∃u∃v[R(x, y) ∧R(y, u) ∧R(u, v) ]
...
By compactness, this theory is not finitely axiomatizable in first-order logic.
A well-known concept used to characterize similarity of two theories wrt a signature is insepa-
rability. This notion has also appeared in the context of entailment in Description Logics, e.g., see
[18,32].
Definition 2.4 (∆–inseparability) Theories T1 and T2 in L are called ∆–inseparable, for a signa-
ture ∆, if Cons (T1, ∆) = Cons (T2, ∆).
In other words, T1 and T2 are ∆–inseparable if for any L-formula ψ in signature ∆, T1 entails
ψ iff T2 does. That is, in the language L, no query in signature ∆ separates T1 and T2 from each
other. If Cons () is augmented with the third parameter specifying a logic, in which consequences
are taken, then inseparability gives rise to a variety of notions of similarity between theories. As in-
formally noted, two theories may be inseparable wrt a logic L, but entail different consequences wrt
a language more expressive than L. For the purpose of this paper, we consider the non-parametrized
notion of inseparability, assuming that the language of interest is the underlying logic L, in which
the theories are formulated. This assumption is natural if one is only interested in entailment of
L-formulas.
Inseparability plays an important role for decompositions. Assume that we have a theory T that
is ∆-decomposable into some components T1 and T2. Although, the union T1 ∪ T2 must entail all
consequences of T in the signature ∆, the components T1 and T2 may not be ∆–inseparable, if we
demand them to be finite. For example, the set of∆–consequences of T2 may not be finitely axiom-
atizable in L by axioms of T1. This easily follows from Fact 2.3 which shows that this phenomenon
is already possible in weak languages such as the sub-boolean description logic EL. On the other
hand,∆–inseparability of decomposition components can always be obtained if the underlying logic
L has uniform interpolation (cf. Proposition 2 in [38]). Both∆–decomposition and∆–inseparability
are required to achieve modularity. Without∆–inseparability the components are not self-sufficient,
since a component may not entail some of the consequences in the shared vocabulary∆. The ideal
case is when a theory T has ∆-decomposition into finite ∆–inseparable components, as noted in
Fact 2.6 further in this section.
In contrast to decomposability, deciding ∆-inseparability of theories is usually harder, than de-
ciding entailment in the logic in which the theories are formulated, as proved by the results in [18],
[32], and the results on the complexity of deciding conservative extensions [29,12]. However, there
are practical cases in which this property is guaranteed to hold for any decomposition components
of a given theory wrt a certain signature ∆. For example, if the theory without equality is a set of
ground atoms, then such theory is∆-decomposable iff there exist two subsets of atoms having only
∆-symbols in common and containing at least one non-∆-symbol. This property is easy to check
by computing syntactic connectedness of the signature symbols. It is straightforward to verify that if
∆ does not contain predicate symbols, then the obtained decomposition components are guaranteed
to be ∆-inseparable. In other words, a set of ground atoms can be easily decomposed into insep-
arable components, if they share constants only with no common predicate symbols. A practically
important generalization of theories consisting of ground atoms is proper+ theories [21,27]. Devel-
oping computationally tractable techniques for decomposition of proper+ theories into inseparable
components is of particular interest. We note the importance of having inseparable decomposition
components below.
The well-known property of logics related to signature decompositions of theories is the Parallel
Interpolation Property (PIP) first considered in a special form in [20] and studied later in a more
general form in [17].
Definition 2.5 (Parallel Interpolation Property) A logicL is said to have the parallel interpolation
property (PIP) if for any theories T1, T2 in L with sig (T1) ∩ sig (T2) = ∆ and any formula ϕ in
L, the condition T1 ∪ T2 |= ϕ yields the existence of sets of formulas T ′1 and T
′
2 in L such that:
– Ti |= T ′i , for i = 1, 2, and T
′
1 ∪ T
′
2 |= ϕ;
– sig (T ′i ) \∆ ⊆ (sig (Ti) ∩ sig (ϕ)) \∆.
Note that PIP is closely related to Craig’s interpolation [5,6]. In fact, PIP can be understood as an
iterated version of Craig’s interpolation in the logics that have compactness and deduction theorem
(see Lemma 1 in [38]). Many logics known to have Craig interpolation – e.g., second- and first-order
logics, numerous modal logics, and some description logics, also have PIP. It is easy to note that, in
the presence of PIP, decomposing a set T of formulas into inseparable components wrt a signature
∆ gives a family of theories that imply all the consequences of T in their own subsignatures.
Fact 2.6 Let L have PIP, T be a theory in L, and∆ a signature. Let 〈T1, T2〉 be a∆–decomposition
of T , with T1 and T2 being ∆–inseparable. Then for any formula ϕ with sig (ϕ) ⊆ sig (Ti), for
some i = 1, 2, we have T |= ϕ iff Ti |= ϕ.
Proof. Assume sig (ϕ) ⊆ sig (T1). If T1 |= ϕ then T |= ϕ by definition of∆–decomposability. If
T |= ϕ then T1∪T2 |= ϕ and by PIP, there are T ′1 and T
′
2 such that T1 |= T
′
1 , T2 |= T
′
2 , T
′
1 ∪T
′
2 |= ϕ,
and sig (T ′2 ) ⊆ ∆. As T1 and T2 are∆–inseparable, we obtain T1 |= T
′
2 and conclude that T1 |= ϕ.
In other words, in the presence of PIP, inseparable decomposition components can be used in-
stead of the original theory for checking the entailment of formulas in the corresponding subsigna-
tures. This is the reason for our interest in the inseparability property in connection with decompo-
sitions. As shown in [1,2,3], a decomposition of a theory can be beneficial even without insepara-
bility thanks to applying the known methods of distributed reasoning via message passing between
components. However, if components are inseparable, then the reasoner can avoid message passing
completely.
2.3 Basics of the Situation Calculus
The language of the situation calculus Lsc has the first-order syntax over three sorts action,
situation, object. It is provided with the standard model-theoretic semantics. It is defined over the
countably infinite alphabet Asc = {do,, S0, Poss} ∪ A ∪ F ∪ O ∪ P , where do is a binary
function symbol of sort situation;  is a binary relation on situations; S0 is the constant of sort
situation; Poss(a, s) is a binary predicate (saying whether a is possible in s) with the first argument
of sort action and the second one of sort situation; A is a set of action functions with arguments of
sort object, F is a set of so-called fluents, i.e., predicates having as arguments a tuple (vector) of
sort object and one last argument of sort situation; O is a set of constants of sort object; and P is
a set of static predicates and functions, i.e., those that only have objects as arguments. A symbol
v ∈ Asc (predicate or function) is called situation-independent if v ∈ A ∪O ∪ P . A ground term is
of sort situation iff it is either the constant S0 or a term do(A(t¯), S), where A(t) is a ground action
term and S is a ground situation term. For instance, a term do(A2(t¯2), do(A1(t¯1), S0)) denotes the
situation resulting from executing actions A1(t¯1) andA2(t¯2) consecutively from the initial situation
S0. Informally, static predicates specify object properties that never change no matter what actions
are executed and fluents describe those object properties that are situation–dependent. The language
of the situation calculus is used to formulate basic action theories (BAT s); they may serve as the
formal specifications of planning problems. Every BAT consists of a set of foundational axioms
Σ, which specify constraints on how the function do and fluents must be understood, a theoryDuna
stating the unique name assumption for action functions and objects, an initial theoryDS0 describing
knowledge about the initial situation S0, a theoryDap specifying preconditions of action execution,
and a theory Dss (the set of successor-state axioms, SSAs for short) which contains definitions of
fluents in the next situation in terms of static predicates and the values of fluents in the previous
situation. A detailed example of a BAT is given at the end of this section.
Example 1 (The Blocks World).We illustrate some of the syntactic definitions using the well-known
BlocksWorld example. The domain of objects in this example consists of blocks that can form towers
such that a block can be on the top of only one other block and conversely only one block can be stay-
ing on the top of another block. The unary predicate Block holds for objects. The towers of blocks
can be described using the fluents On(x, y, s), a block x is on y in situation s, and Clear(x, s), a
block x is clear in s meaning that there is no block on top of x in situation s. The first fluent applies
to pairs of blocks in a tower, while the second fluent characterizes the top block. An initial the-
ory DS0 may include axioms about the initial configuration of blocks named using object constants
A,B,C, e.g.,On(A,B, S0), the blockA is onB initially, ¬∃xOn(x,A, S0) and ¬∃xOn(x,C, S0),
i.e., there are no blocks on top of blocks A and C. Notice that both fluents are predicates with situa-
tion as the last argument. A theoryDuna includes axioms saying that all blocksA,B,C are pairwise
distinct. The function move(x, y, z) maps blocks x, y, z into a separate sort action that represents
moving block x staying on top of block y from block y onto another block z. The precondition
axioms Dap characterize when this action is possible, e.g.,move(A,B,C) is possible in the initial
situation S0, because both A and C are clear, but move(B,A,C) is not possible in S0, because the
block B is not clear, and it is not staying on A in S0. The situation do(move(A,B,C), S0) results
from executing action move(A,B,C) in the initial situation S0. This action has effects on the flu-
ents in the sense that the fluent predicates about S0 may change their truth values in the situation
do(move(A,B,C), S0). Observe however that in do(move(A,C,B), do(move(A,B,C), S0)) flu-
ents are true iff they are true in S0, sincemove(A,C,B) is inverse wrt move(A,B,C) when these
actions executed consecutively. The following successor state axiom characterizes all effects of all
actions on the fluent On:
∀x, y, z, a, s On(x,z, do(a,s)) ↔ ∃y(a=move(x,y,z)) ∨On(x,z,s)∧¬∃y(a=move(x,z,y))
More specifically, block x is on block z after doing an action a in situation s iff the last action a was
moving x from some other block y to z, or if x was already on z in s, and the last action a did not
move it elsewhere. Subsequently, we do not write the ∀-quantifiers explicitly at front of the axioms.
In every basic action theory D over a signature σ ⊆ Asc, the set of foundational axioms Σ
consists of the following formulas [42] (note the axiom schema for induction):
∀ a1, a2, s1, s2 [do(a1, s1) = do(a2, s2) → a1 = a2 ∧ s1 = s2]
∀ s ¬(s  S0 ∧ s 6= S0)
∀ s1, s2 [s1  s2 ↔ ∃a (do(a, s1)  s2) ∨ s1 = s2]
∀P P (S0) ∧ ∀a, s[P (s)→ P (do(a, s))] → ∀sP (s)
Reiter observed in [42] that foundational axioms Σ generalize a single successor function over nat-
ural numbers to the case of multiple successors over situations. The second order induction axiom
serves to exclude non-standard trees as models.
For every pair of distinct action functions {A,A′} ⊆ σ and every pair 〈a, b〉 of distinct object
constants from σ, a theoryDuna contains axioms of the form:
a 6= b
∀ x¯, y¯ A(x¯) 6= A′(y¯)
∀ x¯, y¯ A(x1, . . . , xn) = A(y1, . . . , yn) → x1 = y1 ∧ . . . ∧ xn = yn if A is n–ary.
No other axioms are inDuna.
To define the remaining subtheories of BAT , we need to introduce the following syntactic notion
(taken from [37,43]).
Definition 2.7 A formula ϕ in language Lsc is called uniform in a situation term S if:
1. it does not contain quantifiers over variables of sort situation;
2. it does not contain equalities between situation terms;
3. the predicates Poss, do not occur in ϕ: {Poss,} ∩ sig (ϕ) = ∅;
4. for every fluent F ∈ sig (ϕ), the term in the situation argument of F is S.
A set T of formulas in Lsc is called uniform in a situation term S if every formula of T is uniform
in S.
By definition, a set T of formulas uniform in a situation term S either does not contain any situation
terms (and hence, fluents), or the only situation term is S which occurs as the situation argument
of each fluent from sig (T ). In the example above, the formula on the right hand side of the SSA
is a formula uniform in s. If T is a set of sentences uniform in situation term S, i.e., T has no
free variables, and S occurs in formulas of T , then by items (1), (2) of the definition, S must be
ground and thus, it must either be the constant S0, or have the form do(A(t¯), S′), where S′ is a
ground situation term. Note that if the constant S0 or the binary function symbol do is present in
sig (T ) and T is uniform in S, then necessarily S0 ∈ sig (S), or do ∈ sig (S), respectively. By
items (1) and (2), such theory T does not restrict the interpretation of the term S and the cardinality
of the sort situation, so the observations above lead to the following property of uniform theories,
which informally can be summarized by saying that in sentences of a theory T uniform in a ground
situation term S, we can understand this situation term as playing a role of an index that can remain
implicit. Whenever we change the interpretation of S (e.g., by choosing a different interpretation for
do and S0) in a model of T , it suffices to “move” interpretations of fluents to this new point to obtain
again a model for T .
Lemma 2.8 Let T be a set of sentences uniform in a ground situation term S. Let M = 〈Act ∪
Sit ∪ Obj, do,S0,F1, . . . ,Fn, I 〉 be a model of T , where Act, Sit, and Obj are domains for
the corresponding sorts action, situation, and object, do and S0 are the interpretations of the func-
tion do and constant S0, respectively, F1, . . . ,Fn are the interpretations of fluents from sig (T ),
and I is the interpretation of the rest of symbols from sig (T ). For example, Fi is a set of tuples
〈u1, . . . , um−1,S〉, where S is the interpretation of the ground term S inM.
Consider the structureM′ = 〈Act ∪ Sit′ ∪ Obj, do′,S0
′,F1
′, . . . ,Fn
′, I 〉, where Sit′ is an
arbitrary set, the domain for sort situation, do′ and S0
′ are arbitrary interpretations of do and S0
on Sit′, respectively, and for i 6 n, Fi
′ denotes the interpretation of the fluent Fi as a set of tuples
〈u1, . . . , um−1,S′〉, with S′ being the interpretation of term S inM′ and 〈u1, . . . , um−1,S〉 ∈ Fi.
Then,M′ is a model of T . By definition, the interpretation of situation–independent predicates
and functions is the same inM′ andM.
This lemma can be easily proved by induction over possible syntactic form of sentences in T . If
S and S′ are two situation terms and T is a set of formulas uniform in S, then we denote by T (S′/S)
the set of formulas obtained from T by replacing every occurrence of S with S′. This notation will
be extensively used in Section 4. Obviously, T (S′/S) is uniform in S′.
The initial theory DS0 of D is defined as an arbitrary set of sentences in the signature σ that
are uniform in the situation constant S0. Throughout the paper, we assume that DS0 is a theory in
(any fragment of) second-order logic that can be translated into a set of sentences of first-order logic
uniform in S0. In particular,DS0 can include both an ABox and a TBox in an appropriateDescription
Logic, as argued in [16,48].
Next, for every n-ary action functionA ∈ σ, a theory Dap includes an axiom of the form
∀ x¯, s
(
Poss(A(x¯), s) ↔ ΠA(x¯, s)
)
,
where ΠA(x¯, s) is a formula uniform in s with free variables among x¯ and s. Informally,ΠA(x¯, s)
characterizes preconditions for executing the action A in the situation s. No other formulas are in
Dap.
Example 1 (continuation). The following is the precondition axiom formove(x, y, z):
Poss(move(x, y, z), s)↔ Block(x) ∧Block(y) ∧Block(z) ∧On(x, y, s)∧
Clear(x, s) ∧ Clear(z, s) ∧ x 6= z
The action move(x, y, z) is possible iff x, y, z are blocks, x is located on y in situation s, and
both the block x that is to be moved, and a destination block z are not occupied by any other blocks.
Notice the preconditions do not allow moving a block back to the same location where it was before.
Finally, for every fluent F ∈ σ, a theoryDss contains an axiom of the form
∀ x¯, a, s
(
F (x¯, do(a, s)) ↔ γ+F (x¯, a, s) ∨ F (x¯, s) ∧ ¬γ
−
F (x¯, a, s)
)
(†),
specifying a condition γ+F (x¯, a, s) when fluent F becomes true in situation do(a, s), or when F
remains true in situation do(a, s) if it is true in s, unless another condition γ−F (x¯, a, s)] holds. Here,
γ+F is a disjunction of formulas of the form [∃y¯](a = A
+(t¯) ∧ φ+(x¯, y¯, s)), where A+ is an action
function, t¯ is a (possibly empty) vector of object terms with variables at most among x¯ and y¯, and
φ+ is a formula uniform in s with variables at most among x¯, y¯, and s. We write [∃y¯] to show that ∃y¯
is optional; it is present only if t¯ includes y¯ or if φ has an occurrence of y¯. The formula φ+ is called
a positive context condition meaning that A+(t¯) makes the fluent F true if this context condition
holds in s, but otherwise, A+(t¯) has no effect on F . Similarly, γ−F is a disjunction of formulas of
the form [∃z¯](a = A−(t¯′) ∧ φ−(x¯, z¯, s)), where A− is an action function, t¯′ is a (possibly empty)
vector of object terms with variables at most among x¯ and z¯, and φ− is a formula uniform in s with
variables at most among x¯, z¯, and s. The formula φ− is called a negative context conditionmeaning
that A−(t¯) makes the fluent F false if this context condition holds in s, but otherwise, A−(t¯) has
no effect on F . In the definition above, we assume that the empty disjunction is equal to false. No
other formulas are in Dss. This completes the definition of Dss. Subsequently, the following will be
useful.
Definition 2.9 (SSA and active position of an action) The axioms of Dss in the form above are
called successor state axioms (SSAs) of a basic action theory D.
An action function f is said to be in active position of some SSA ϕ ∈ Dss if f occurs either as
A+, or A− in the definition of Dss above.
We say that ϕ ∈ Dss is SSA for the fluent F if F is the fluent from the left-hand side of ϕ.
Example 1 (continuation). The following is the SSA for the fluentEH(x, s)meaning the height
of a block x is even, i.e., the number of blocks under x is odd:
EH(x, do(a, s)) ↔ ∃y, z
(
a=move(x, y, z) ∧ ¬EH(z, s)
)
∨
EH(x, s) ∧ ¬∃y, z
(
a=move(x, y, z) ∧ EH(z, s)
)
.
Then formula ¬EH(z, s) is a positive context condition. If it holds in s, i.e., if the height of
block z is not even in a situation s, then in the situation that results from moving x from y to a
block z, the height of x becomes even. But if the positive context condition does not hold in s, then
move(x, y, z) does not make the height of block x even. Also, if the height of x is even in s, then
it remains even unless a block x is moved from y on top of z and the height of z is even in s. The
formula EH(z, s) is a negative context condition, i.e., if the height of block z is even in s, then
the action move(x, y, z) has a negative conditional effect on the fluent EH(x, s) in the sense that
this fluent becomes false in the situation that results from doingmove(x, y, z) in s. In this SSA, an
action functionmove occurs both as A+ and A− on the right hand side of this SSA.
Following the consistency requirement on SSAs by Reiter (see Proposition 3.2.6 in [43]), we
require that if an action function f occurs in active position in some SSA for a fluent F , then f is
not in active position in either γ+F , or γ
−
F . Informally, this means that an action cannot have both
positive and negative effects on F .
Each SSA for a fluent F completely defines the truth value of F in the situation do(a, s) in terms
of what holds in situation s. Also, SSA compactly represents non-effects by quantifying ∀a over
variables of sort action. Only action terms that occur explicitly on the right-hand side of SSA for a
fluent F have effects on this fluent, while all other actions have no effect.
We note that the original version of Reiter’s situation calculus admits functional fluents, e.g.
functions having a vector of arguments of sort object and one last argument of sort situation. Reiter
defines the notion of SSA for functional fluents [43]. Without loss of generality, we omit functional
fluents in this paper.
The following fundamental result, which will be used in our Theorem 4.4, says that the initial
theory together with the UNA is the core of any basic action theory, while the rest of the constituent
theories may be considered as add-ons.
Proposition 2.10 (Theorem 1 in [37]) A basic action theory Σ ∪ Duna ∪ DS0 ∪ Dap ∪ Dss is
satisfiable iffDuna ∪DS0 is satisfiable.
Suppose A1, · · · ,An is a sequence of ground action terms, and ϕ(s) is a formula with one free
variable s of sort situation which is uniform in s. One of the most important reasoning tasks in the
situation calculus is the projection problem: that is, to determine whether
D |= ϕ(do(An, do(An−1, do(· · · , do(A1, S0))))).
Informally,ϕ represents some property of interest and entailment holds iff this property is true in the
situation resulting from performing the sequence of actionsA1, · · · ,An starting from S0.
Another basic reasoning task is the executability problem. Let
executable(do(An, do(An−1, do(· · · , do(A1, S0)))))
be an abbreviation of the formula
Poss(A1, S0) ∧
∧n
i=2 Poss(Ai, do(A1, do(· · · , do(Ai−1, S0))).
Then, the executability problem is to determine whether
D |= executable(do(An, do(An−1, do(· · · , do(A1, S0))))),
i.e. whether it is possible to perform the sequence of actions starting from S0.
Planning and high-level program execution are two important settings, where the executability
and projection problems arise naturally. Regression is a central computational mechanism that forms
the basis for an automated solution to the executability and projection tasks in the situation calculus
([43]). Regression requires reasoning backwards: a given formula
ϕ(do(An, do(An−1, do(· · · , do(A1, S0)))))
is recursively transformed into a logically equivalent formula by using SSAs until the resulting for-
mula has only occurrences of the situation term S0. It is easy to see that regression becomes compu-
tationally intractable if the sequence of actions grows indefinitely [16]. In this case, an alternative to
regression is progression, which provides forward-style reasoning. The initial theoryDS0 is updated
to take into account the effects of an executed action. Computing the progression of a given theory
DS0 requires forgetting facts in DS0 which are no longer true after executing an action. The closely
related notions of progression and forgetting are discussed in the next sections.
Definition 2.11 (local-effect SSA and BAT ) An SSAϕ ∈ Dss for the fluentF is called local-effect
if the set of arguments of every action function in active position of ϕ contains all object variables
from F . A basic action theory is said to be local-effect if every axiom of Dss is a local-effect SSA.
Local-effect BAT s are a well-known3 class of theories, for which the operation of progression
(Section 4) can be computed effectively [27], without regard to decidability of the underlying theory
DS0 . They are special in the sense that the truth value of each fluent defined by a local-effect SSA
can change only for objects explicitly named as arguments of the executed action. Therefore, in
local-effect BAT s, each action can change only finitely many ground fluent atoms. This allows
for computing forgetting (the operation considered in Section 3) efficiently. Informally speaking,
forgetting erases fromDS0 those finitely many fluent atoms which changed after executing an action.
Example 1 (continuation). Observe that in the Blocks World example considered above, the
actionmove has only local effects on the fluentsOn andClear. As an informal example of an action
that has global effects, consider the action drive(t, l1, l2) of driving a truck t loaded with boxes from
one location l1 to another location l2. Consider also the fluent At(x, l, s) that holds if an object x is
at a location l in s. Observe that this action would have a global effect on location of all boxes loaded
on the truck since these boxes are not named explicitly in the action function drive(t, l1, l2), but the
SSA for At(x, l, s) would have a ∀-quantifier over the object argument x. Therefore, the truth value
of At(x, l, s) changes not only for t, but also for other objects not mentioned in drive(t, l1, l2). It
would be awkward to include all the boxes loaded in t as arguments of this action. For this reason,
axioms for the logistics domain should include actions with global effects on the fluents.
Before we proceed to a discussion of component properties under forgetting (Section 3) and to
progression of initial theories (Section 4), we consider an example that helps to illustrate the notion of
BAT and the advantages of decomposition of its initial theory. Our example combines the simplified
Blocks World (BW) with a kind of Stacks World. A complete axiomatization of BW modelled as a
finite collection of finite chains can be found in [4]. In this example, and subsequently, we resort to
the common situation calculus convention that free variables in BAT axioms are implicitly taken to
be universally quantified at front.
Example 2 (A running example of BAT ). The blocks-and-stacks-world consists of a finite set of
blocks and a finite set of other entities. Blocks can be located on top of each other, while other entities
can be either in a heap of unlimited capacity, or can be organized in stacks. There is an unnamed
manipulator that can move a block from one block to another, provided that there is nothing on the
top of the blocks. It can also put an entity from the heap upon a stack with a named top element,
or move the top element of a stack into the heap. For stacking/unstacking operations we adopt the
push/pop terminology and use the unary predicate Block to distinguish between blocks and other
entities. We use the following action functions and relational fluents to axiomatize this example as a
local-effect BAT in SC.
Actions
– move(x, y, z): Move block x from block y onto block z, provided both x and z are clear.
3 The phrase local-effect actions first appeared in [28], but it was motivated by actions with simple effects
defined in the paper [24], where simple effects are understood similar to the Def. 2.11.
– push(x,y): Stack entity x from the heap on top of entity y.
– pop(x): Unstack entity x into the heap, provided x is the top element and is not in the heap.
Fluents
– On(x, z, s): Block x is on block z, in situation s.
– Clear(x, s): Block x has no other blocks on top of it in s.
– Top(x, s): Entity x is the top element of a stack in s.
– Inheap(x, s): Entity x is in the heap in situation s.
– Under(x, y, s): Entity y is directly under x in a stack in situation s.
The sub-theories of the basic action theory are defined as follows.
Successor state axioms (theory Dss)
On(x, z, do(a, s)) ↔ ∃y(a=move(x, y, z)) ∨On(x, z, s) ∧ ¬∃y(a=move(x, z, y))
Clear(x, do(a, s)) ↔ ∃y, z(a=move(y, x, z)∧
On(y, x, s)) ∨ Clear(x, s)∧ ¬∃y,z(a=move(y, z, x))
Inheap(x, do(a, s))↔ a=pop(x) ∨ Inheap(x, s) ∧ ¬∃y(a=push(x, y))
Top(x, do(a, s))↔ ∃y( a=push(x, y) ) ∨ ∃y( a=pop(y) ∧ Under(y, x, s) ) ∨
Top(x, s) ∧ a 6=pop(x) ∧ ¬∃y(a=push(y, x))
Under(x, y, do(a, s)) ↔ a=push(x, y) ∨ Under(x, y, s) ∧ a 6=pop(x)
The first axiom is saying that a block x will be on top of a block z after moving x from another
block y onto z, or if x was already on z and it was not moved elsewhere. The second axiom is saying
that x will become clear, i.e., there will be no blocks on top of x after moving the block y that was
previously on top of x onto another block z. Otherwise, if a block x was already clear, it remains
clear unless some block y will be moved from the block z onto the block x. The third axiom asserts
that an entity x is in a heap once it has been removed from a stack, or if it was already in a heap,
and it was not stacked on top of another entity y. In the fourth axiom, when an entity x is stacked
upon an entity y, x become the new top. Also, it becomes the top, when x was located under some
y that was removed into a heap. Otherwise, an entity x remains on the top unless it was unstacked
or buried under by stacking another entity y onto x. In the last fifth axiom, an entity y will be under
another entity x after stacking x on top of y, or y remains under x after any action that does not
remove x into a heap. It is easy to observe that all these SSAs are local-effect, and we will exploit
this fact later in our paper.
Action precondition axioms (theoryDap)
Poss(move(x, y, z), s)↔ Block(x) ∧Block(y) ∧Block(z) ∧On(x, y, s)∧
Clear(x, s) ∧ Clear(z, s) ∧ x 6= z
Poss(push(x, y), s)↔ ¬Block(x) ∧ ¬Block(y) ∧ Top(y, s) ∧ Inheap(x, s)
Poss(pop(x), s) ↔ ¬Block(x) ∧ Top(x, s)
The precondition axioms are self-explanatory. The actionmove(x, y, z) is possible in any situa-
tion s where a block x is located on top of a block y, both x and a destination block z are clear (i.e.,
not obstructed by any blocks on top of them) and x is different from z. The last condition precludes
moving x on top of itself. According to the second precondition axiom, it is possible to stack x on
y in any situation s, if x and y are entities which are not blocks, y is the top of a stack, and x is in a
heap. The opposite operation of unstacking x is possible if and only if x is a top entity in situation s.
Initial Theory (DS0) is defined as the set of axioms
4 using object constants {A,B,C}:
¬∃yOn(y, x, S0) ∧ ∃yOn(x, y, S0) ∧ ¬Inheap(x, S0)→Clear(x, S0)
∃y On(x, y, S0)→ Block(x)
(Top(x, S0) ∨ Inheap(x, S0)) → ¬Block(x)
On(A,B, S0)∧Block(B)∧Block(C)∧ Clear(A,S0)∧ Clear(C, S0)
Unique names axioms for actions and objects (theory Duna) is the set of unique names axioms
for all pairs of object constants and action functions used above.
Then Σ ∪ Duna ∪Dap ∪ Dss ∪ DS0 is the resulting local-effect basic action theory.
Notice that all fluents are syntactically related in DS0 , so purely syntactic techniques fail to
decomposeDS0 into components sharing no fluents. However,Dss is the union of two theories with
the intersection of signatures equal to {do}. The set of precondition axioms is also union of two
theories – the first axiom by itself is one of them, and the conjunction of the second and third axioms
is another one – with the intersection of signatures equal to {Poss,Block}. At the same time,
the initial theory DS0 is ∆–decomposable for ∆ = {Block, S0} into two distinct ∆–inseparable
components:
¬∃y On(y, x, S0) ∧ ∃y On(x, y, S0)→ Clear(x, S0)
∃y On(x, y, S0) → Block(x)
On(A,B, S0)∧Block(B)∧Block(C)∧Clear(A,S0)∧ Clear(C, S0)
and
(Top(x, S0) ∨ Inheap(x, S0))→ ¬Block(x)
∃x Block(x)
This example is continued after Theorem 4.5 in Section 4, where we will show that the progres-
sion for BAT s of this kind preserves both decomposability and inseparability of the decomposition
components.
3 Properties of Forgetting
There are two basic types of forgetting considered in the literature: forgetting a signature and
forgetting a ground atom. As will be explained in Section 4, progression of BAT s is closely related
to forgetting. In particular, computing progression of a local-effect BAT involves forgetting a set
of ground atoms representing facts that are no longer true after an action execution. Thus, in order
to understand the behavior of the component properties of theories under progression, one needs to
first examine their relationship to forgetting, which is the purpose of this section. Although we are
focused on forgetting ground atoms, the counterpart results for signature forgetting often come for
free and are therefore included into this section. Moreover, they help to see the difference between
the two types of forgetting, which contributes to a better understanding of this operation wrt the
component properties, which we believe would be of interest to a broader audience in the literature.
To emphasize broader applicability of these results, we consider a general first- and second-order
logic setting in the remainder of this section.
4 Some of these axioms, e.g., the second axiom, remain true after executing any of the possible actions, but
this fact is irrelevant to the purposes of this example.
Let us define a relation on structures as follows. Let σ be a signature or a ground atom andM,
M′ be two many–sorted structures. Then we setM∼σ M′ if:
– M andM′ have the same domain for each sort;
– M andM′ interpret all symbols which do not occur in σ identically;
– if σ is a ground atom P (t¯) thenM andM′ agree on interpretation u¯ of t¯ and for every vector
of elements v¯ 6= u¯, we haveM |= P (v¯) iffM′ |= P (v¯).
Obviously,∼σ is an equivalence relation.
The following notion summarizes the well-known Definitions 1 and 7 in [25].
Definition 3.1 (Forgetting an atom or signature) Let T be a theory in L and σ be either a signa-
ture, or some ground atom. A set T ′ of formulas in a fragment of second-order logic is called the
result of forgetting σ in T (denoted by forget (T , σ)) if for any structureM′, we haveM′ |= T ′
iff there is a modelM |= T such thatM∼σ M′.
It is known that forget (T , σ) always exists, i.e. it is second-order definable, for a finite set of
formulas T in L and a finite signature or a ground atom σ (see [25], or Section 2.1 in [27]). On the
other hand, the definition yields T |= forget (T , σ); thus, forget (T , σ) is a set of second-order
consequences of T which suggests that it may not always be definable in the logic, where T is
formulated, and it may not be finitely axiomatizable in this logic, even if T is so.
Fact 3.2 (Basic properties of forgetting) If σ and pi are signatures or ground atoms and T , T ′ are
theories in L then:
– forget (T , σ ∪ pi) ≡ forget (forget (T , σ), pi) (if σ and pi are signatures)
– forget (forget (T , σ), pi) ≡ forget (forget (T , pi), σ)
– forget (forget (T , σ), σ) ≡ forget (T , σ)
– forget (T , σ) ≡ T if σ is a signature with σ ∩ sig (T ) = ∅, or a ground atom with predicate
not contained in sig (T )
– forget (T ∪ T ′, σ) 6≡ forget (T , σ) ∪ forget (T ′, σ) (see Example 5)
– forget (ϕ ∨ ψ, σ) ≡ forget (ϕ, σ) ∨ forget (ψ, σ) (if ϕ, ψ are formulas inL).
These properties either follow immediately from the definition, or from the results proven in [25].
Proposition 3.3 (Signature of forget(T ,σ)) Let T be a theory in L, σ a signature (or a ground
atom) and let forget (T , σ) be a set of formulas in a language L′, a fragment of second-order
logic with PIP. Then forget (T , σ) is logically equivalent in L′ to a set of formulas in the signature
sig (T ) \ σ (sig (T ), respectively).
Proof. We consider the case when σ is a signature; the case of a ground atom being proved analo-
gously. Assume that σ ∩ sig (forget (T , σ)) 6= ∅. Denote by forget (T , σ)∗ a “copy" of the set
of formulas forget (T , σ), where each symbol from σ∪[sig (forget (T , σ))\sig (T )] is uniquely
replacedwith a fresh symbol, not present in sig (forget (T , σ)). We claim that forget (T , σ)∗ |=L′
forget (T , σ). There is nothing to prove if forget (T , σ)∗ is unsatisfiable. Note that, by def-
inition of forgetting, forget (T , σ)∗ and forget (T , σ) are satisfiable iff T is. Let us assume
that T is satisfiable. Take an arbitrary model M∗ |= forget (T , σ)∗; then there exists a model
M′ |= forget (T , σ) which agrees on sig (forget (T , σ)∗) with M∗ and interprets symbols
from σ ∪ [sig (forget (T , σ)) \ sig (T )] equally to the interpretation of the corresponding fresh
symbols inM∗. Therefore, we may assume thatM∗ ∼σ M′. By definition of forgetting, there is
a model M |= T such that M′ ∼σ M, hence M∗ ∼σ M andM∗ |= forget (T , σ). We have
forget (T , σ)∗ |=L′ forget (T , σ) and sig (forget (T , σ)∗)∩sig ( forget (T , σ))⊆ sig (T )\
σ. By PIP, there is a set of formulasΘ in signature sig (T )\σ such that forget (T , σ)∗ |=L′ Θ and
Θ |=L′ forget (T , σ). Note that forget (T , σ)∗ |=L′ Θ yields forget (T , σ) |=L′ Θ, because ev-
ery model of forget (T , σ) can be expanded to a model of forget (T , σ)∗ and the reduct of this
model onto (a subset of) sig (T ) \ σ suffices to satisfy Θ. Thus, we conclude that forget (T , σ) is
equivalent to Θ.
Corollary 3.4 Let T be a theory in L having PIP and σ a signature. Then T ≡ forget (T , σ) iff
T is equivalent to a set of formulas in the signature sig (T ) \ σ.
We note that the similar statement does not hold when σ is a ground atom. It follows from Propo-
sition 3.3 that in case σ is a signature, forget (T , σ) axiomatizes the class of reducts of models of
T onto the signature sig (T ) \ σ. Clearly, if T is a theory in language L, then forget (T , σ) may
not be in L, however it is always expressible in second-order logic if T is finitely axiomatizable (we
note that second-order logic has PIP). For the case when σ is a signature, forget (T , σ) is known as
sig (T ) \ σ–uniform interpolant of T wrt the language L and second-order queries, that is, wrt the
pair (L, second-order logic), see Definition 13 in [18] and Lemma 39 in [32] for a justification. In
other words, T and forget (T , σ) semantically entail the same second-order formulas in signature
T \ σ.
If σ is a ground atom P (t¯) then, by definition, for any modelM |= T , forget (T , σ) must have
two “copies” ofM: a model with the value of P (t¯) false and a model where this value is true. Let L
be first-order logic. In contrast to forgetting a signature, for any recursively axiomatizable theory T
in L and a ground atom σ, one can effectively construct the set of formulas forget (T , σ) in L such
that forget (T , σ) is finitely axiomatizable iff T is. This follows from Theorem 4 in [25], where
it is shown that forgetting a ground atom P (t¯) in a theory T can be computed by simple syntactic
manipulations:
– for an axiom ϕ ∈ T , denote by ϕ[P (t¯)] the result of replacing every occurrence of atom P (t¯′)
(with t¯′ a term) by formula [t¯ = t¯′ ∧ P (t¯)] ∨ [t¯ 6= t¯′ ∧ P (t¯′)]
– denote by ϕ+[P (t¯)] the formula ϕ[P (t¯)] with every occurrence of the ground atom P (t¯) re-
placed with true and similarly, denote by ϕ−[P (t¯)] the formulaϕ[P (t¯)] with P (t¯) replaced with
false
– then forget (T , P (t¯)) is equivalent to (
∧
ϕ∈T ϕ
+[P (t¯)])
∨
(
∧
ϕ∈T ϕ
−[P (t¯)]).
The disjunction corresponds to the union of two classes of models obtained from models of
T , with the ground atom P (t¯) interpreted as true and false, respectively. This fact is important for
effective computation of progression for local-effect BAT s mentioned in Section 4.
Example 3 (Forgetting a ground atom).Consider a theory T = {ϕ}, where ϕ = ¬P (c), i.e., P (c) is
false in every model of T . Consider forgetting P (c) in T . By the (semantic) definition of forgetting,
the set of models of forget (T , P (c)) consists of models of T and those models, in which P (c) is
true. Therefore, any structure is a model of forget (T , P (c)). Now consider the syntactic definition
of forgetting given above. We have
ϕ[P (c)] = ¬([c = c ∧ P (c)] ∨ [c 6= c ∧ P (c)])
thus, ϕ+[P (c)] ≡ false, ϕ−[P (c)] ≡ true and hence, forget (T , P (c)) ≡ ϕ+[P (c)] ∨ ϕ−[P (c)]
is a tautology.
Now consider forgetting P (c) in the theory T = {ϕ}, where ϕ = ∀xP (x). By the (semantic)
definition of forgetting, any structure, in which P is true on every element, except possibly, the
interpretation of c, is a model of forget (T , P (c)). By the syntactic definition of forgetting we
have:
ϕ[P (c)] = ∀x ( [x = c ∧ P (c)] ∨ [x 6= c ∧ P (x)] )
thus, ϕ+[P (c)] = ∀x ( x = c ∨ [x 6= c ∧ P (x)] ), ϕ−[P (c)] = ∀x ( x 6= c ∧ P (x) ). Since
ϕ−[P (c)] ≡ false, we obtain forget (T , P (c)) ≡ ϕ+[P (c)] and hence, forget (T , P (c)) ≡
∀x ( x 6= c → P (x) ).
We note that in case a theory T is finitely axiomatizable, computing forget (T , P (t¯)) in the way
above doubles the size of theory in the worst case, due to the disjunction. It is sometimes necessary
to consider forgetting of some set S of ground atoms in a theory T . This is equivalent to iterative
computation of forgetting of atoms from S starting from the theory T (the order on atoms can be
chosen arbitrary as noted in Fact 3.2). However, it is important to note that the size of the resulting
theory is O(2|S| × |T |), where |S| is the number of atoms in S and |T | is the size of T .
Proposition 3.5 (Interplay of forgetting and entailment) Let T and T1 be two sets of formulas in
L, with T |= T1, and σ be a signature or a ground atom. Then the following holds:
T |=
|=
T1
|= |=
forget (T , σ) forget (T1, σ)
Proof. Follow the diagram starting from the top-left column. By definition of forgetting, everymodel
of T is a model of forget (T , σ), so we have T |= forget (T , σ) as shown in the left column of the
diagram. Similarly, T1 |= forget (T1, σ) in the right column of the diagram. To prove entailment
at the bottom we rely on entailments in the columns and on the given entailment at the top, i.e., we
navigate the diagram up from the bottom-left corner, then move right, and finally go down to the
bottom-right expression. Let M′ be an arbitrary model of forget (T , σ). Then there is a model
M |= T such that M ∼σ M′. Since T |= T1, we have M |= T1, so we conclude that M′ |=
forget (T1, σ), because M is a model satisfying the conditions of Definition 3.1 for T1 and M′.
Thus, we proved entailment shown in the bottom row of the diagram.
Proposition 3.6 (Preservation of consequences under forgetting) Let T be a theory in L and σ
be either a signature or a ground atom. Let ϕ be a formula such that either sig (ϕ) ∩ σ = ∅ (in
case σ is a signature), or which does not contain the predicate from σ (if σ is a ground atom). Then
T |= ϕ iff forget (T , σ) |= ϕ.
Proof. From Proposition 3.5, we have T |= forget (T , σ), thus forget (T , σ) |= ϕ yields T |= ϕ.
Now let T |= ϕ and assume there is a modelM′ of forget (T , σ) such thatM′ 6|= ϕ. By definition
of forgetting, there exists a model M of T such that M ∼σ M′, i.e. M and M′ have the same
universe and may differ only on interpretation of signature σ (ground atom σ). By the condition on
signature of ϕ, thenM is not a model of ϕ, which contradicts T |= ϕ.
Now we answer the question when inseparability is preserved under forgetting. This is important
for our research, since we are interested in preservation of inseparability under progression, the
operation which relies on forgetting in local-effect BAT s. We demonstrate that it is important to
distinguish between forgetting something in ∆ (the common symbols of theories) or outside of
the shared signature. While Proposition 3.6 shows that the situation is simple in the latter case,
it is apriory unclear, whether the same holds in the former. Example 4 demonstrates that this is
not true, while the accompanying Propositions 3.7, 3.8 describe the cases when this situation can
be recovered. We believe that giving the accompanying positive results is important in order to
provide a big picture to the reader. Proposition 3.7 shows that signature forgetting (the arguably
more frequently used type of forgetting in the literature) preserves inseparability, while Proposition
3.8 tackles this question from another perspective. It shows that semantic inseparability, the property
also well studied in the literature, is the stronger form of inseparability, which is invariant under
forgetting.
Observe that by Proposition 3.6 and the first item of Fact 3.2, when studying preservation of
∆–inseparability of two sets of formulas for a signature ∆, it is sufficient to consider the case of
forgetting a subset of∆ or a ground atom with the predicate from∆, respectively.
Proposition 3.7 (Preservation of∆–insep. under signature forgetting) Let L have PIP and T1
and T2 be two ∆–inseparable sets of formulas in L with sig (T1) ∩ sig (T2) = ∆, for a signature
∆. Let σ be a subsignature of ∆ and forget (T1, σ) and forget (T2, σ) be sets of formulas of L.
Then forget (T1, σ) and forget (T2, σ) are ∆–inseparable.
Proof. Let ϕ be a formula with sig (ϕ) ⊆ ∆ such that forget (T1, σ) |= ϕ. By Proposition 3.3, we
may assume that for i = 1, 2 the signature of forget (Ti, σ) is a subset of sig (Ti) \ σ. We depict
the direction of the proof in the figure below.
T1 |= T ′1 ⇒ T2 |= T
′
1
⇒
⇒
forget (T1, σ) |= T ′1 |= ϕ forget (T2, σ) |= T
′
1
|= ϕ
We start with the lower-left corner of the diagram and navigate up, then right, and finally down.
As forget (T1, σ) |= ϕ, by PIP, there is a set of formulas T ′1 with sig (T
′
1 ) ⊆ sig (forget (T1,
σ)) ∩ sig (ϕ) ⊆ ∆ \ σ such that forget (T1, σ) |= T ′1 and T
′
1 |= ϕ. Then, by Proposition
3.6, we have T1 |= T ′1 . This proves entailment in the top-left corner. Since T1 and T2 are ∆–
inseparable and sig (T ′1 ) ⊆ ∆, we obtain T2 |= T
′
1 . Therefore, the top-right entailment holds.
Again, since sig (T ′1 ) ∩ σ = ∅, by Proposition 3.6, we conclude that forget (T2, σ) |= T
′
1 and
thus, forget (T2, σ) |= ϕ.
The following example demonstrates that a similar result does not hold under forgetting a ground
atom with the predicate from∆.
Example 4 (∆–inseparability lost under forgetting a ground atom). We give an example of a logic
L, sets of formulas T1, T2 in L, and a signature ∆ = sig (T1) ∩ sig (T2) such that T1 and T2
are ∆–inseparable, but forget (T1, R(c, c)) and forget (T2, R(c, c)) are not, for a ground atom
R(c, c) with a predicate R ∈ ∆. Let L be Description Logic ELO⊥, i.e. the sub-boolean logic EL
augmented with nominals and the bottom concept ⊥. Let Σ = {R, a, c} be signature, where R is
a role name (binary predicate) and a, c are nominals (i.e. constants). Define a set of formulas T1 in
the signature Σ as {{a} ⊓ {c} ⊑ ⊥, {c} ⊑ ∃R.{a}, ⊤ ⊑ ∃R.⊤}. Set ∆ = {R, c} and consider
the set of formulas T2 = {⊤ ⊑ ∃R.⊤, T aut(c)}, where Taut(c) is a tautology with the nominal
c (e.g., the formula {c} ⊑ ⊤). We have sig (T1) ∩ sig (T2) = ∆ and it is easy to check that T2
is equivalent to Cons (T1, ∆) in the logic ELO
⊥; thus, T1 and T2 are ∆–inseparable. Now consider
forget (T1, R(c, c)) and forget (T2, R(c, c)) as sets of formulas in second-order logic (we assume
the standard translation of formulas of ELO⊥ into the language of second-order logic). We verify
that they are not ∆–inseparable and the formula ⊤ ⊑ ∃R.⊤ is the witness for this. By definition
of T1, we have forget (T1, R(c, c)) |= T1, since any model of T1 with a changed truth value of
the predicate R on the pair 〈c, c〉 is still a model of T1. On the other hand, forget (T2, R(c, c)) 6|=
⊤ ⊑ ∃R.⊤, because T2 has the one–element modelM, where R is reflexive (on the sole element
corresponding to c). Hence, by definition of forgetting, the one-element modelM′ with R false on
the pair 〈c, c〉 must be a model of forget (T2, R(c, c)), but obviously,M′ 6|= ⊤ ⊑ ∃R.⊤.
It turns out that the preservation of inseparability under forgetting a ground atom requires rather
strong model-theoretic conditions like (*) in Proposition 3.8 below. Specialists might notice that
(*) is equivalent to semantic ∆–inseparability of the initial sets of formulas (see Definition 11 in
[18]) which is very hard to decide from the computational point of view (see Theorem 3 in [30],
Lemma 40 in [32]). Nevertheless, there are practically useful restrictions under which the complexity
becomes feasible [19]. Semantic∆–inseparability is stronger than the notion of inseparability given
in Definition 2.4: it means that the theories are indistinguishable by second-order formulas. On the
other hand, Proposition 3.8 says that whenever there is a chance to satisfy (*) for two given sets of
formulas, one does not need to check it again after forgetting something in their common signature.
To compare condition (*) with Example 4, note that the aforementioned one-element model of T2
does not expand to a model of T1 ∪ T2.
Proposition 3.8 (Preservation of∆–inseparability under forgetting) Let T1 and T2 be two sets
of formulas in L, with sig (T1) ∩ sig (T2) = ∆, for a signature ∆, which satisfy the following
condition (*): for i = 1, 2, any model of Ti can be expanded to a model of T1 ∪ T2. Then:
– T1 and T2 are ∆–inseparable;
– for σ a signature or a ground atom, forget (T1, σ) and forget (T2, σ) satisfy (*) as well.
Proof. ∆–inseparability is the immediate consequence of (*): if ϕ is a formula with sig (ϕ) ⊆ ∆,
T1 |= ϕ, but T2 6|= ϕ, then there is a modelM2 of T2 such thatM2 6|= ϕ. Then there is an expansion
M ofM2 such thatM |= T1∪T2,M|sig (T1) |= T1, butM|sig (T1) 6|= ϕ, a contradiction. Now let us
verify that for i = 1, 2, any model of forget (Ti, σ) can be expanded to a model of forget (T1, σ)∪
forget (T2, σ). For instance, let M′2 be a model of forget (T2, σ). Consider a modelM2 of T2,
such that M2 ∼σ M′2, and expand it to a modelM of T1 ∪ T2. Then by definition of forgetting,
there must be a modelM′ |= forget (T1, σ) withM′ ∼σ M, which agrees withM′2 on σ (if σ is
a signature), or on the predicate of σ (if σ is a ground atom). By construction,M′ is an expansion
ofM′2 and thus a model for forget (T1, σ) ∪ forget (T2, σ).
Let T1 and T2 be two sets of formulas in L, with sig (T1) ∩ sig (T2) = ∆, for a signature ∆,
and let σ be either a subsignature of ∆ or a ground atom with the predicate from ∆. It is known
that in general, forgetting σ may not be distributive over union of sets of formulas. The entailment
forget (T1 ∪ T2, σ) |= forget (T1, σ) ∪ forget (T2, σ) holds by Proposition 3.5, but Example
5 below easily shows that even strong semantic conditions related to modularity do not guarantee
the reverse entailment. On the other hand, forgetting something outside of the common signature of
T1 and T2 is distributive over union, as formulated in Corollary 3.10 which is a consequence of the
criterion in Proposition 3.9 and is used in the proof of one of our main results, Theorem 4.5.
Example 5 (Failure of componentwise forgetting in ∆). Let L be first-order logic and ∆ = {P, c}
be the signature consisting of a unary predicateP and a constant c. Define theories T1 and T2 as: T1 =
{A → P (c)}, T2 = {P (c) → B}, where A,B are nullary predicate symbols. We have sig (T1) ∩
sig (T2) = ∆ and for i = 1, 2, any model of Ti can be expanded to a model of T1 ∪ T2. Clearly, T1
and T2 are∆–inseparable and for i = 1, 2, Cons (Ti, ∆) is the set of tautologies in ∆. By definition
of forgetting, for i = 1, 2, forget (Ti, P (c)) is a set of tautologies and thus, forget (T1, P (c)) ∪
forget (T2, P (c)) 6|= forget (T1 ∪ T2, P (c)), because forget (T1 ∪ T2, P (c)) |= A → B (by
Proposition 3.6). For the case of forgetting a signature, say a nullary predicate P , it suffices to
consider ∆ = {P} and theories T1 = {A → P}, T2 = {P → B}, where A,B are nullary
predicates.
Proposition 3.9 (A criterion for componentwise forgetting) Let T1 and T2 be two sets of formulas
and σ either a signature or a ground atom. Then the following statements are equivalent:
– forget (T1, σ) ∪ forget (T2, σ) |= forget (T1 ∪ T2, σ)
– for any two modelsM1 |= T1 and M2 |= T2, with M1 ∼σ M2, there exists a modelM |=
T1 ∪ T2 such thatM∼σ Mi, for some i = 1, 2.
Proof. Note in the second condition, the requirementM ∼σ Mi for some i = 1, 2 is equivalent to
M∼σ Mi for all i = 1, 2, by transitivity of∼σ . (⇒): LetM1 |= T1 andM2 |= T2 be models with
M1 ∼σ M2. Then there are modelsM′1 andM
′
2 such that for i = 1, 2,M
′
i |= forget (Ti, σ) and
M′i ∼σ Mi. Then, by transitivity of ∼σ , for all i, j = 1, 2 we haveM
′
i ∼σ Mj and thus,M
′
i |=
forget (Tj , σ). ThenM′1 |= forget (T1 ∪ T2, σ), so there exists a modelM |= T1 ∪ T2 such that
M ∼σ M′1 and hence,M∼σ M1. (⇐): LetM
′ be a model of forget (T1, σ) ∪ forget (T2, σ).
There exist modelsM1 andM2 such that for i = 1, 2,Mi |= Ti andMi ∼σ M′. ThenM1 ∼σ
M2, hence, there must be a modelM of T1∪T2 withM∼σ Mi for some i = 1, 2. Then we obtain
thatM∼σ M′ and thus, by definition of forgetting,M′ is a model of forget (T1 ∪ T2, σ).
To compare this criterion with Example 5, observe that there exist modelsM1 |= T1 andM2 |=
T2 with common domain such that M1 |= A ∧ P (c) ∧ ¬B andM2 |= A ∧ ¬P (c) ∧ ¬B. Thus,
M1 ∼P (c) M2, however, there does not exist a modelM of T1 ∪ T2 such thatM ∼P (c) Mi, for
some i = 1, 2. NeitherM1, norM2 is a model for T1 ∪ T2.
Corollary 3.10 (Forgetting in the scope of one component) Let T1 and T2 be two sets of formu-
las, with sig (T1)∩sig (T2) = ∆, for a signature∆, and σ be either a subsignature of sig (T1)\∆
or a ground atom with the predicate from sig (T1) \∆. Then forget (T1 ∪ T2, σ) is equivalent to
forget (T1, σ)∪T2. Moreover, if T1 and T2 are∆–inseparable, then so are forget (T1, σ) and T2.
Proof. Note that by the choice of σ, T2 is equivalent to forget (T2, σ) and thus, by Proposition 3.5,
it suffices to verify the entailment forget (T1, σ)∪ forget (T2, σ) |= forget (T1 ∪T2, σ). If there
are modelsM1 |= T1 andM2 |= T2, withM1 ∼σ M2, then in fact,M1 |= T1 ∪ T2, by the choice
of σ and definition of ∼σ. Thus, the criterion from Proposition 3.9 obviously yields the required
entailment. It remains to note that ∆–inseparability of forget (T1, σ) and forget (T2, σ) follows
from the choice of σ, Proposition 3.6, and∆–inseparability of T1 and T2.
In general, the results of this section prove that the operation of forgetting does not behave well
wrt the modularity properties of the input, since they are logic-dependent. Stronger model-theoretic
conditions on the input are needed due to the model-theoretic nature of forgetting.
4 Properties of Progression
We have considered some component properties of forgetting. It turns out that the operation of
progression is closely related to forgetting in initial theories. However, in case of progression, we
can not restrict ourselves to working with initial theories only; we need also to take into account
information from successor state axioms. The aim of this section is to study component properties
of progression wrt different forms of SSAs and common signatures ∆s (deltas) of components of
initial theories. We will consider local-effect SSAs discussed in [27] and deltas, which do not contain
fluents.
We use the following notations further in the paper. For a ground action term α in the language
of the situation calculus, we denote by Sα the situation term do(α, S0). To define progression, we
introduce an equivalence relation on many-sorted structures in the situation calculus signature. For
two structuresM,M′ and a ground action α, we setM∼Sα M
′ if:
– M andM′ have the same sorts for action and object;
– M andM′ interpret all situation-independent predicate and function symbols identically;
– M andM′ agree on interpretation of all fluents at Sα, i.e., for every fluent F and every variable
assignment θ, we haveM, θ |= F (x¯, Sα) iffM′, θ |= F (x¯, Sα).
That is, ifM∼Sα M
′ then the structuresM andM′ are allowed to differ in sorts for situation
and interpretations of fluents at situation terms, not equal to Sα.
Note that a similar notation with ∼ is used to denote the equivalence relation on models from
Definition 3.1 of forgetting. The two notations are easily distinguished depending on the context and
are standard in the literature, therefore we adopt both of them in our paper.
Definition 4.1 (Progression, modified Definition 9.1.1 in [43]) LetD be a basic action theory with
unique name axioms Duna and the initial theoryDS0 , and let α be a ground action term. A set DSα
of formulas in a fragment of second-order logic is called progression ofDS0 wrt α if it is uniform in
the situation term Sα and for any structureM,M is a model of Σ ∪ Dss ∪ Dap ∪ Duna ∪ DSα iff
there is a modelM′ of D such thatM∼Sα M
′.
Below, we use DSα to denote progression of the initial theory wrt the action term α, if the
context of BAT is clear. We sometimes abuse terminology and call progression not only the theory
DSα , but also the operation of computing this theory (when the existence of an effective operation is
implicitly assumed). It can be seen (Theorem 2 in [26] and Theorem 2.10 in [27]) that progression
always exists, i.e., is second-order definable, if the signature of BAT is finite and the initial theory
DS0 is finitely axiomatizable. On the other hand, by the definition, for any BAT D, we have D |=
DSα and, similarly to the operation of forgetting, it is possible to provide an example (see Definition
2, Conjecture 1, and Theorem 2 in [45]), when the progression DSα is not definable (even by an
infinite set of formulas) in the logic in which D is formulated.
To understand the notion of progression intuitively, note the following. The progression DSα
is a set of consequences of BAT that are uniform in the situation term Sα; it can be viewed as
the strongest postcondition of the precondition DS0 wrt the action α. Thus, informally, DSα is all
the information about the situation Sα implied by BAT . This is guaranteed by the model-theoretic
property with the relation ∼Sα in the definition. Recall that the initial theory of BAT describes
information in the initial situation S0 and SSAs are essentially the rules for computing the new
truth values of fluents that change after performing actions. Thus, progression DSα can be viewed
as minimal “modification” of the initial theory obtained after executing the action α. In particular,
the initial theory of BAT can be replaced with DSα(Sα/S0) (recall the notation from Section 2.3)
which gives a new BAT , with Sα as the new initial situation. Let ϕ(s) be a formula uniform in a
situation variable s. To solve the projection problem for ϕ(Sα), i.e., to find whether ϕ(Sα) holds in
the situation Sα wrt BAT D, one might wish to compute progression DSα and then check whether
Duna ∪ DSα |= ϕ(Sα) holds (or equivalently, whether Duna ∪ DSα(S0/Sα) |= ϕ(S0) holds). By
Proposition 2.10, this is equivalent to D |= ϕ(Sα), so this progression-based approach solves the
projection problem for ϕ(Sα). This helps to demonstrate why progression may be useful.
Consequently, of interest are cases when progression can be computed effectively as a theory in
the same logic that is used to formulate underlyingDS0 . The well-known approach is to consider the
local-effect BAT s (recall Definition 2.11) in which progression can be obtained by just a syntactic
modification of the initial theory DS0 with respect to SSAs. This approach is based on effective
forgetting of a finite set of ground atoms (extracted from SSAs) in the initial theory of BAT . Recall
the well–known observation from Section 3 that, given a theory T (in an appropriate logic L),
forgetting a finite set of ground atoms in T can be computed effectively by straightforward syntactic
manipulations with the axioms of T . Thus, the cornerstone of computing progression in the local-
effect case is to extract effectively the set of ground atoms from SSAs that need to be forgotten.
Subsequently, inDSα , they are replaced with new values of fluents, which are computed from SSAs.
An interested reader may consult the whole paper [27], while here we only introduce necessary
notations from Definition 3.4 of [27], which will be used in Theorem 4.5.
Let D be a BAT with a set Dss of SSAs, an initial theory DS0 , and a unique name theory
Duna, and let α be a ground action term. Take a generic SSA (†) for the fluent F (see Section 2.3)
and replace there an action variable a with the action term α. Then, use unique name axioms for
actions to replace equalities (or negations of equalities) between action functions with equalities (or
negations of equalities, respectively) between object arguments. After that, apply the usual FO logic
equivalences to eliminate existential quantifiers inside γ+F (x¯, α, s), γ
−
F (x¯, α, s), if any. Recall these
are formulas uniform in s that appear on the right-hand side of a generic SSA (†). Observe that in a
local-effect SSA, when one substitutes a ground action termA(b¯x, b¯z) for a variable a in the formula
[∃z¯].a=A(x¯, z¯) ∧ φ(x¯, z¯, s), applying UNA for actions yields [∃z¯].x¯= b¯x ∧ z¯= b¯z ∧ φ(x¯, z¯, s), and
applying ∃z(z = b ∧ φ(z)) ≡ φ(b) repeatedly results in the logically equivalent formula x¯= b¯x ∧
φ(x¯, b¯z, s). In a transformed SSA that is obtained after doing all these simplifications, it is convenient
to consider all object constants appearing in equalities between object variables and constants. These
represent values where the fluent F changes. To compute the new value of the fluent it is sufficient
to instantiate object variables of F with the corresponding constants. Denote
∆F = {t¯ | x¯ = t¯ appears in γ
+
F (x¯, α, s) or γ
−
F (x¯, α, s) in a transformed SSA
for F instantiated with α and equivalently rewritten wrt Duna},
Ω(s) = {F (t¯, s) | t¯ ∈ ∆F }.
Consider Ω(s) and notice that Ω(S0) is a finite set of ground atoms to be forgotten. According
to Fact 3.2, forgetting several ground atoms can be accomplished consecutively in any order.
An instantiation of Dss wrt Ω(S0), denoted by Dss[Ω(S0)], is the set of formulas of the form:
F (t¯, do(α, S0)) ↔ γ
+
F (t¯, α, S0) ∨ F (t¯, S0) ∧ ¬γ
−
F (t¯, α, S0).
These formulas represent instantiations of the transformed SSAs with object constants where the
fluents change. Observe that Dss[Ω(S0)] effectively defines new values for those fluents, which are
affected by the action α. However, these definitions use fluents wrt S0, which may include fluents to
be forgotten. For this reason, forgetting should be performed not only in DS0 , but in Dss[Ω(S0)] as
well.
Proposition 4.2 (Theorem 3.6 in [27]) In the notations above, the following is a progression of
DS0 wrt α in the sense of Definition 4.1:
DSα = forget
(
Dss[Ω(S0)] ∪ DS0 , Ω(S0)
)
(Sα/S0).
This formula demonstrates that progression is a set of formulas obtained after forgetting old
values of fluents in the initial theory and in instantiation of transformed SSAs that provide new
values of fluents, and then replacing S0 with Sα. Thus, computing a progression in a local-effect
BAT is an effective syntactic transformation of the initial theory, which leads to the unique form
of the updated theory DSα . This fact will be used in Theorem 4.5. It is important to realize that
this transformation can lead to an exponential blow-up of the initial theory, as noted after Theorem
3.6 in [27], due to the possible exponential blow-up after forgetting a set of ground atoms. This is
not a surprise, because even in propositional logic, forgetting a symbol in a formula is essentially
the elimination of a “middle term" (introduced by Boole), which results in the disjunction of two
instances of the input formula [23]. As a consequence, forgetting may result in a formula that is
roughly twice as long as the input formula. It is important to realize that the exponential blowup is
not inevitable in the case of progression. As shown in [27], there are practical classes of the initial
theories for which there is no blow-up and the size of the progressed theory is actually linear wrt the
size of the initial theory.
Example 1 (continuation). As was discussed before, all SSAs in this example are local effect.
Instantiate the action variable a in the SSAs with a ground actionmove(C1, C2, C3). Then, we get:
Clear(x, do(move(C1 , C2, C3), s)) ↔ ∃y, z
(
move(C1, C2, C3)=move(y, x, z)
)
∨
Clear(x, s) ∧ ¬∃y, z(move(C1, C2, C3)=move(y, z, x)),
On(x, y, do(move(C1, C2, C3), s)) ↔ ∃z
(
move(C1, C2, C3)=move(x, z, y)
)
∨
On(x, y, s) ∧ ¬∃z
(
move(C1, C2, C3)=move(x, y, z)
)
.
Applying UNA for actions yields the following axioms:
Clear(x, do(move(C1, C2, C3), s)) ↔ ∃y, z
(
y=C1 ∧ x=C2 ∧ z=C3
)
∨
Clear(x, s) ∧ ¬∃y, z(y=C1 ∧ z=C2 ∧ x=C3),
On(x, y, do(move(C1, C2, C3), s)) ↔ ∃z(x=C1 ∧ z=C2 ∧ y=C3)∨
On(x, y, s) ∧ ¬∃z(x=C1 ∧ y=C2 ∧ z=C3).
Doing the equivalent first order simplifications yields the transformed SSAs:
Clear(x, do(move(C1 , C2, C3), s))↔ (x=C2) ∨ Clear(x, s) ∧ ¬(x=C3),
On(x, y, do(move(C1 , C2, C3), s))↔ (x=C1 ∧ y=C3) ∨On(x, y, s) ∧ ¬(x=C1 ∧ y=C2).
The argument set∆F for the fluent F wrt a ground action α is a set of constants appearing in the
transformed SSA for F instantiated with α. For example, the set ∆clear for the fluent Clear(x, s)
wrt a ground actionmove(C1, C2, C3) is {C2, C3}. For the fluentOn(x, y, s) this argument set∆on
is {〈C1, C3〉, 〈C1, C2〉}. The characteristic set Ω of a ground action move(C1, C2, C3) is a set of
all ground atoms subject to change by this action. Therefore
Ω(s) = {Clear(C2, s), Clear(C3, s), On(C1, C3, s), On(C1, C2, s)}.
Notice that if block C3 is clear at s, it no longer remains clear after doingmove(C1, C2, C3) action,
but blockC2 will become clear. However, this action has no effect on the property of C1 being clear,
and for this reason, C1 is not in∆clear and not in the characteristic set Ω.
Using these atoms to instantiate the transformed SSA, i.e., by replacing object arguments with
constants from∆F , we obtain the set Dss[Ω] of formulas representing new values of fluents, e.g.,
On(C1, C3, do(move(C1, C2, C3), S0)) ↔
C1=C1 ∧ C3=C3 ∨ On(C1, C3, S0) ∧ ¬(C2=C3 ∧C3=C2).
After the equivalent simplifications using UNA, the instantiated SSAs wrt Ω(Sα), where Sα =
do(move(C1, C2, C3), S0) will be the following set:
{Clear(C2, Sα),¬Clear(C3, Sα), On(C1, C3, Sα),¬On(C1, C2, Sα)}.
Note that in this example Dss[Ω] are very simple, but in a general case, if a SSA includes con-
text conditions, these axioms may include fluents wrt S0. Finally, according to Proposition 4.2, to
compute a progression DSα of an initial theory DS0 for BW, we have to forget all old values of the
fluents from Ω(S0) in the theory Dss[Ω] ∪DS0 , and subsequently replace the situation Sα with S0.
Now we are ready to formulate the results on component properties of progression in terms of
decomposability and inseparability. We start with negative examples in which every BAT is local-
effect and the initial theories are formulated in first-order logic. As the progression DSα is a set of
formulas uniform in some situation term Sα, which may occur in every formula of DSα (thus po-
tentially spoiling decomposability), we consider the mentioned decomposability and inseparability
properties regarding the theory DSα(S0/Sα) instead of DSα . Otherwise, in every result we would
have to speak of∆∪sig (Sα)–decomposability of progression, since the symbols from sig (Sα)=
sig (do(α, S0))={do, S0} ∪ sig (α) may occur in all components.
Consider a BAT D with ∆–decomposable initial theory DS0 for a signature ∆. The general
definition of a successor state axiom gives enough freedom to design examples showing (non-
)preservation of the decomposability property of DS0 or inseparability of its components. Note that
an SSA may contain symbols that are not even present in sig (DS0), or symbols from both com-
ponents of DS0 (if decomposition exists). Therefore, it makes sense to restrict our study to those
BAT s, where SSAs have one of the well-studied forms, e.g., to local-effect theories. It turns out that
this form is still general enough to easily formulate negative results demonstrating that the afore-
mentioned properties are not preserved without stipulations.
First, we provide an example showing that the decomposability property of the initial theory can
be easily lost under progression. Next, we show that ∆–inseparability of components of the initial
theory DS0 can be easily lost when fluents are present in ∆ (see Example 7). The third observation
is that even if there are no fluents in ∆, some components of DS0 can split after progression into
theories which are no longer inseparable (see Example 8). All observations hold already for local-
effect BAT s and follow from the fact that some new information from SSAs can be added to the
initial theory after progression, which spoils its component properties. We only need to provide a
combination of an initial theory with a set of SSAs that are appropriate for this purpose. The aim
of Theorem 4.4 following these negative examples is to prove that if ∆ does not contain fluents
and the components of DS0 do not split after progression, then ∆–inseparability is preserved after
progression under a slight stipulation which is caused only by generality of the theorem and the non-
uniqueness of progression in the general case. This stipulation is avoided in Theorem 4.5, where
we consider the class of local-effect BAT s. Recall that all free variables in axioms of BAT s are
assumed to be universally quantified.
Example 6 (Decomposability lost under progression).Consider basic action theoryD, with {F, P,A, c} ⊆
sig (D), where F is a fluent, P a predicate, A an action function, and c an object constant. Let the
theory Dss consist of the single axiom
F (x, do(a, s)) ↔ (a = A(x)) ∧ P (x) ∨ F (x, s)
and let the initial theory DS0 consist of two axioms ¬F (c, S0) and ∃xP (x). Clearly, DS0 is a ∅–
decomposable.
Consider action α = A(c) and let us compute progression of DS0 wrt α. We apply Proposition
4.2, since D is local-effect. The instantiation of the SSA from Dss with α has the form
F (x, do(A(c), s)) ↔ (A(c) = A(x)) ∧ P (x) ∨ F (x, s)
for which equivalent rewriting wrt Duna gives
F (x, do(A(c), s)) ↔ (x = c) ∧ P (x) ∨ F (x, s)
Hence, we have Ω(S0) = {F (c, S0)} and Dss[Ω(S0)] = F (c, Sα) ↔ P (c) ∨ F (c, S0).
Since ¬F (c, S0) ∈ DS0 , the theory Dss[Ω(S0)] ∪ DS0 is equivalent to {F (c, Sα) ↔ P (c)} ∪
DS0 . By Proposition 4.2, forgetting the ground atom F (c, S0) in this theory and substituting S0 with
Sα gives the theory DSα , the progression of DS0 wrt α. By using the definition of forgetting, it is
easy to confirm that DSα is equivalent to {F (c, Sα) ↔ P (c), ∃xP (x)}. One can verify that DSα
(and also DSα(S0/Sα)) is not ∆–decomposable theory, for any ∆. Notice that decomposability is
lost, because fluent F and predicate P from different components of DS0 become related to each
other after progression.
For a signature ∆, with S0 ∈ ∆, and an action A(c), we now give an example of a local-effect
basic action theoryD withDS0 , an initial theory∆–decomposable into finite∆–inseparable compo-
nents. This example shows that progressionDSα(S0/Sα) ofDS0 wrtA(c) (with term Sα substituted
with S0) is finitely axiomatizable and ∆–decomposable, but the decomposition components are no
longer∆–inseparable, unless we allow them to be infinite.
Example 7 (∆–inseparability is lost when fluents are in ∆). Consider a basic action theory D with
{F, P,R,A, b, c} ⊆ sig (D), where F is a fluent, P,R are predicates,A an action function, and b, c
object constants. Let∆ = {F,R, S0, c} and define subtheories of D as follows:
Dss = {F (x, do(a, s)) ↔ (a = A(x)) ∧ P (x) ∨ F (x, s)} (i.e. as in the previous example)
DS0 = D1 ∪ D2,with
D1 = {Taut(F,R, S0, b), ¬F (c, S0)}, where Taut(F,R, S0, b, c) is a
tautological formula in the signature {F,R, S0, b, c},which is uniform in S0
D2 = {P (x)→ ∃y(R(x, y) ∧ P (y)), ¬F (c, S0)}.
By the syntactic form,DS0 is∆–decomposable:we haveDS0 = D1∪D2, sig (D1)∩sig (D2) =
∆, sig (D1) \ ∆ = {b}, and sig (D2) \ ∆ = {P}. It is also easy to confirm that D1 and D2 are
∆–inseparable.
By Proposition 4.2 it is easy to verify that the union of {Taut(F,R, S0, b, c)} and D′2 = (D2 \
{¬F (c, S0)}) ∪ {ϕ}, where ϕ = F (c, Sα)↔ P (c) is a progression (DSα) of DS0 wrt α = A(c).
By the syntactic form, DSα(S0/Sα) is a ∆–decomposable theory. On the other hand, we have
ϕ |= F (c, Sα)→ P (c), thus
D′2(S0/Sα) |= {F (c, S0)→ ∃yR(c, y) , F (c, S0)→ ∃y∃z[R(c, y) ∧R(y, z)] , . . .}
This is an infinite set of formulas in signature ∆. It follows from Fact 2.3 that this theory is not
finitely axiomatizable by formulas of first-order logic in signature ∆ and it is easy to verify that
DSα(S0/Sα) can not have a decomposition into finite ∆–inseparable components.
Note that in the example above, the initial theory DS0 is in fact ∅–decomposable with one
signature component equal to {b} and the other component containing the rest of the symbols. It is
easy to see that the progression of DS0 wrt A(c) is ∅–decomposable as well. We use tautologies
in the example just to illustrate the idea that information from SSA can propagate to the initial
theory after progression, thus making the components lose the inseparability property. There is a
plenty of freedom to formulate similar examples with the help of non-tautological formulas which
syntactically “bind” symbols F,R, S0, b in the theory D1. We appeal to a similar observation in
Example 8.
Example 8 (Split of a component and loss of ∆–inseparability). Consider BAT D,
with {F1, F2, D,B, P,R,A, c} ⊆ sig (D), where F1, F2 are fluents, D,B, P,R predicates, A an
action function, and c an object constant. Let ∆ = {D,R, S0} and define the subtheories of D as
follows:
Dss = {F1(x, do(a, s)) ↔ F1(x, s) ∧ ¬(a = A(x)), F2(x, do(a, s)) ↔ F2(x, s)}
DS0 = D1 ∪ D2,where D1 is the set of formulas with occurrences ofD,R, S0:
D(x) ∨R(x, y)→ F1(c, S0)
D(x) → P (x)
P (x) → ∃y(R(x, y) ∧ P (y))
and D2 consists of the following three formulas (which also mentionD,R, S0):
D(x) → B(x)
B(x) → ∃y(R(x, y) ∧B(y))
Taut(F2, S0), a tautology in the signature {F2, S0}, uniform in S0. Here,
F2 is an auxiliary fluent introduced to have an occurrence of S0 in D2.
By definition, DS0 is ∆–decomposable into ∆–inseparable components D1 and D2. Note that
Dss |= ¬F1(c, do(A(c), S0)), which is the result of substitution of the ground actionA(c), situation
constant S0, and object constant c in SSA.
Consider progression of DS0 wrt the action α = A(c). By Proposition 4.2, it is equivalent to the
theory DSα = D
′
1 ∪ D
′′
1 ∪ D
′
2, where D
′
1 is the set of the following formulas:
¬F1(c, do(A(c), S0))
Taut(D,R), a tautological formula in the signature {D,R} which is uniform in Sα,
D′′1 is the set of formulas:
D(x) → P (x)
P (x) → ∃y(R(x, y) ∧ P (y))
Taut(F2, Sα), a tautological formula in the signature {F2, do, A, c, S0} which
is uniform in Sα
and D′2 is the theory D2 with every occurrence of S0 substituted with Sα.
Clearly, DSα(S0/Sα) is ∆–decomposable. Note that after progression the component D1 is
“split” intoD′1(S0/Sα) andD
′′
1 (S0/Sα) and these theories are not∆–inseparable (similarly,D
′
1(S0/Sα)
and D′2(S0/Sα)). By Fact 2.3, it can be shown that they can not be made ∆–inseparable while re-
maining finitely axiomatizable.
To formulate the theorems below, we let D denote a BAT with the initial theory DS0 , the set
of successor state axioms Dss, and the unique name axioms Duna. Example 7 has resulted in the
following definition.
Definition 4.3 (Fluent–free signature) A signature ∆ is called fluent–free if no fluent (from the
alphabet of situation calculus) is contained in∆.
Theorem 4.2 complements Examples 4.3 and 4.4, which identify properties of decomposed ac-
tions theories causing loss of inseparability of components after progression. The theorem shows
that if these properties are absent then inseparability is preserved. As we have already seen in Ex-
ample 7, the initial theory and progression may differ in consequences involving symbols of fluents.
Thus in general, preservation of ∆–inseparability can be guaranteed only for fluent-free signatures
∆, which is reflected in the conditions of the theorem. Besides, by the model-theoretic Definition
4.1, progression is not uniquely defined – there is no restriction on occurrences of the unique name
axioms in progression, which may easily lead to loss of inseparability of the components. In other
words, progression may logically imply unique name axioms even if the initial theory did not imply
them. Some decomposition components of progression may imply such formulas, while the oth-
ers may not. For this reason, we speak of inseparability “modulo” theory Duna in the first point
of the theorem below. In particular, we have to make the assumption that not only the components
{Di}i∈I⊆ω of the initial theory are pairwise∆–inseparable, but so are the theories {Duna∪Di}i∈I .
For fluent-free deltas, the progression entails exactly those ∆-formulas, which are entailed al-
ready by the initial theory (together with UNA-axioms), and the question is how these formulas
can be “distributed” between the components. The second point of the theorem rules out the case
(described in Example 8), when ∆-consequences are split between the components of progression.
Note that in the theorem we do not specify how the progression was obtained (cf. Theorem 4.5) and
the only condition that relates the components of progression with those of the initial theory says
about containment of∆–consequences.
Theorem 4.4 (Preservation of∆-insep. for fluent-free∆) Let L have PIP and D be a BAT in
which DS0 and Duna are theories in L. Let σ ⊆ sig (DS0) be a fluent–free signature and denote
∆ = sig (Duna) ∪ σ. Suppose the following:
– DS0 is σ–decomposable with some components {Di}i∈I⊆ω such that the theories from {Duna∪
Di}i∈I are pairwise ∆–inseparable;
– DSα(S0/Sα) is equivalent to the union of theories {D
′
j}j∈J⊆ω such that for every j ∈ J and
some i ∈ I , Cons (Duna ∪D′j, ∆) ⊇ Cons (Duna ∪Di, ∆).
Then the theories from {Duna ∪D′j}j∈J⊆ω are pairwise ∆–inseparable.
Proof. Let us demonstrate that for all j ∈ J we have Cons (Duna ∪ D′j , ∆) = Cons (Duna ∪
DS0 , ∆), from which the statement of the theorem obviously follows. Essentially, we prove the
following inclusions (the corresponding points of the proof are marked with circles):
Cons (Duna ∪ DSα(S0/Sα),∆) ⊆ Cons (Duna ∪ DSα ,∆) ⊆ Cons (Duna ∪ DS0 ,∆)
❥2❥3
❥1
⊆
⊇
❥4
Theorem conditions
⊆❥4 Theorem conditions
Cons (Duna ∪ Di,∆)Cons (Duna ∪ D
′
j ,∆)
1) Note that for any i ∈ I , DS0 is σ–decomposable with componentsDi and
⋃
k∈I\{i}Dk. We
claim thatDuna∪Di andDuna∪
⋃
k∈I\{i}Dk are∆–inseparable. Letϕ be a formula in signature∆.
If Duna ∪Di |= ϕ then clearly, Duna ∪
⋃
k∈I\{i}Dk |= ϕ by ∆–inseparability from the condition
of the theorem. On the other hand, if Duna ∪
⋃
k∈I\{i}Dk |= ϕ then by PIP we have Tuna ∪⋃
k∈I\{i} Tk |= ϕ, where Duna |= Tuna, sig (Tuna) ⊆ sig (Duna) and Dk |= Tk for k ∈ I \ {i},
sig (Tk) ⊆ ∆. Again, by∆–inseparability, for each k ∈ I \ {i}we haveDuna ∪Di |= Tk and thus,
Duna ∪Di |= ϕ.
Therefore, if ϕ ∈ Cons (Duna∪DS0 , ∆), then for every i ∈ I , [Duna∪
⋃
k∈I\{i}Dk] ∪ [Duna∪
Di] |= ϕ and then by PIP and inseparability shown above, Duna ∪Di |= ϕ. Since DS0 |=
⋃
i∈I Di
by decomposability, we obtain Cons (Duna ∪ DS0 , ∆) = Cons (Duna ∪Di, ∆) for all i ∈ I .
2) Let us show that Cons (Duna ∪DSα , ∆) ⊆ Cons (Duna ∪DS0 , ∆). First, take a formula ψ ∈
Cons (Duna ∪ DSα , ∆), which does not contain situation terms. From the definition of progression,
every model of D is a model of Duna ∪ DSα , so D |= Duna ∪ DSα and hence, D |= ψ. If Duna ∪
DS0 6|= ψ, then Duna ∪ DS0 ∪ {¬ψ} is satisfiable and since ψ is a uniform formula, by Proposition
2.10, D ∪ {¬ψ} is satisfiable, which contradictsD |= ψ. Therefore,Duna ∪ DS0 |= ψ.
It remains to verify that the set Cons (Duna ∪ DSα , ∆) is axiomatized by sentences which do
not contain situation terms. We have ∆ = sig (Duna) ∪ σ ⊆ sig (Duna) ∪ sig (DS0), so {do,
, Poss}∩∆ = ∅, by definition ofDuna andDS0 . As σ if fluent-free by the condition of the theorem
(and sig (Duna) is fluent-free by definition of BAT ), ∆ may contain only situation–independent
predicates and functions. Thus, any formulaϕ ∈ Cons (Duna∪DSα , ∆)may contain situation terms
only in equalities, where each term is either the constant S0 (in case S0 ∈ σ) or a bound variable
of sort situation. Suppose that this is the case and there is no ψ ∈ Cons (Duna ∪ DSα , ∆) such that
ψ |= ϕ and ψ does not contain situation terms. By the syntax of Lsc and the choice of∆, then ϕ is a
boolean combination of formulas without situation terms and sentences over signature {S0} stating
that ϕ has a model with cardinality |Sit| of sort situation lying in the interval [n,m] for n ∈ ω
and m ∈ ω ∪ {∞}. We denote sentences of this form by ∃[n,m]θ=. We may assume that ϕ is in
conjunctive normal form and that there is a formula ξ, a boolean combination of ∃[n,m]θ= such that
6|= ξ, 6|= ¬ξ, either ξ or ξ ∨ η is a conjunct of ϕ, and η 6∈ Cons (Duna ∪ DSα , ∆), sig (η) ⊆ ∆, is
a formula without situation terms. As 6|= ξ and 6|= ¬ξ, there are n,m ∈ ω such that ξ does not have
a model with |Sit| = n and ¬ξ does not have a model with |Sit| = m. Then by Lemma 2.8, we
conclude thatDuna∪DSα 6|= ξ andDuna∪DSα 6|= ¬ξ. In particular, ξ can not be a conjunct of ϕ. If
ξ∨η is a conjunct, then there exists a modelM ofDuna∪DSα such thatM |= ξ andM 6|= η. Then,
by applying Lemma 2.8 again, there must be a modelM′ of Duna ∪DSα with |Sit| = n where the
interpretation of situation–independent predicates and functions is the same as inM. Thus,M′ 6|= ξ
and since η does not contain situation terms,M′ 6|= η, which contradictsDuna ∪ DSα |= ϕ.
3) Now let us demonstrate that Cons (Duna ∪ DSα(S0/Sα), ∆) ⊆ Cons (Duna ∪ DSα , ∆).
Note that Duna ∪ DSα(S0/Sα) is uniform in S0. Following the above proved, assume that there is
a formula ϕ ∈ Cons (Duna ∪ DSα(S0/Sα), ∆) such that ϕ does not contain situation terms and
Duna ∪DSα 6|= ϕ. Take a modelM of Duna ∪DSα such thatM 6|= ϕ. Then, by Lemma 2.8, there
exists a modelM′ ofDuna∪DSα such that the domain for sort situation inM
′ is a singleton set (i.e.,
the interpretation of terms S0 and Sα coincide inM′) and the interpretation of situation–independent
symbols is the same inM andM′. ThenM′ 6|= ϕ, but clearlyM′ |= Duna ∪ DSα(S0/Sα) which
contradicts the assumption Duna ∪DSα 6|= ϕ.
4) Finally, by the condition of the theorem, for all j ∈ J , we have Duna ∪ D′j ⊆ Duna ∪ DSα
(S0/Sα) and from points 1–3 above we obtain Cons (Duna ∪ DSα(S0/Sα), ∆) ⊆ Cons (Duna ∪
DS0 , ∆). Hence, for all j ∈ J we have Cons (Duna ∪ D
′
j , ∆) ⊆ Cons (Duna ∪ DS0 , ∆). On the
other hand, we also have Cons (Duna ∪ Di, ∆) ⊆ Cons (Duna ∪ D′j, ∆) from the condition of the
theorem. Therefore from the inclusion ∀ i ∈ I Cons (Duna ∪ DS0 , ∆) ⊆ Cons (Duna ∪Di, ∆) of
point 1 we conclude that Cons (Duna ∪D′j, ∆) = Cons (Duna ∪ DS0 , ∆) for all j ∈ J .
The next theorem provides a result on local-effect BAT s with initial theories in first-order logic
for which progression becomes more concrete, since it can be computed by syntactic manipulations.
In contrast to Theorem 4.4, this allows us to judge about inseparability without the theory Duna in
background. Recall that, in general, a BAT includes non-trivial precondition axioms. On the right-
hand side of each precondition axiom, there is a formulaΠA(x¯, s) that is a formula uniform in swith
free variables among x¯ and s. However, any BAT can be transformed into an action theory without
precondition axioms by introducing the right hand side formulas from the precondition axioms as
conjuncts of context conditions for each corresponding active position of an action term in a SSA.
Therefore, without loss of generality, and for simplicity of presentation, we subsequently consider
the BAT s where all precondition axioms are trivial.
Essentially, the conditions of the theorem are defined to guarantee componentwise computation
of progression for a decomposable initial theory. A finite set Dss of the SSAs is considered to be
syntactically divided into the union of |I| sub-theories sharing some fluent-free signature∆1 (which
may include actions, static predicates, and object constants), as well as function do (which occurs
in every SSA). Informally, each of |I| sub-theories is about a different set of properties, e.g., one of
them could be about the blocks world, while another could be about the logistics world, with the two
theories possibly sharing some constants, such as a box name, and situation-independent predicates,
such as shapes of the boxes. The initial theory DS0 is∆2–decomposable, for a fluent-free signature
∆2, into |J | components. To distinguish visually componentsD′j ofDS0 from the componentsDi of
Dss, we write D′j with apostrophe when we mean components of DS0 , and Di without apostrophe
when we mean groups of SSAs. Informally, each component D′j is about a separate aspect of the
initial theory. The syntactic form of the initial theory may not reveal the components readily, but they
can be discovered through decomposition. Naturally, it is expected that independent components of
the initial theory should remain independent after doing any actions. This imposes a condition that
each component from the initial theory should be related with its own group of SSAs.
The last two conditions of the theorem enforce that the subtheories of Dss are aligned with the
components ofDS0 via syntactic occurrences of fluents. The second to last condition says that every
fluent mentioned in a SSA must also occur in the initial theory DS0 . It is easy to satisfy by adding
tautologies with the corresponding fluents to DS0 . Together with the last condition it guarantees that
for every SSA ϕ containing fluents F1, . . . , Fn there is a corresponding component of DS0 , which
describes the initial interpretation of these fluents, and this is the component that must be updated
upon executing an action mentioned in active position of ϕ. The last condition also enforces that
actions, static predicates, or object constants separated by the decomposition of DS0 must be also
separated by the subtheories of Dss, whenever they occur in SSAs. This guarantees that these sym-
bols do not become connected after progression (as opposed to the situation presented in Example
6). Thus, the theory Dss ∪ DS0 can be divided into parts (consisting of successor-state axioms and
statements about the initial situation) which may mention common actions, static predicates and
constants, but talk about different fluents. In other words, these subtheories define independent sets
of situation-related properties, which is natural for a composite action theory describing a single
domain of objects from a number of different perspectives. Note that it is allowed for a single action
to have effects on groups of fluents (possibly, all the fluents at once, without regard to distribution
of the fluents between the subtheories), which is reflected in the theorem condition that ∆1 is just
fluent-free, but not action free. We impose stronger restriction in Corollary 4.6, which describes
a class of BAT s representing composite subject domains, like the one mentioned in the running
example from Section 2.3.
For the reader’s convenience, we stress that in the formulation of the theorem, the indices i and
j vary over components of Dss and DS0 , respectively. The signatures ∆1 and ∆2 are the sets of
allowed common symbols between the components of Dss and DS0 , respectively. We recall that
A (F , respectively) denotes the set of action functions (the set of fluents, respectively) from the
alphabet of the language of the situation calculus.
Theorem 4.5 (Preservation of components in local-effect BAT ) Let D be a local-effect BAT ,
with DS0 an initial theory in first-order logic. Let ∆1, ∆2 be fluent-free signatures, do 6∈ ∆1, ∆2,
and α = A(c¯) a ground action term. Denote∆ = ∆1 ∪∆2 ∪ {c1, . . . , ck}, if c¯ = 〈c1, . . . , ck〉, and
suppose the following:
– Dss is the union of theories {Di}i∈I , with sig (Dn) ∩ sig (Dm) ⊆ ∆1 ∪ {do} for all n,m ∈
I 6= ∅, n 6= m;
– DS0 is ∆2–decomposable into finite components {D
′
j}j∈J uniform in S0 such that sig (D
′
j) \
∆ 6= ∅, for all j ∈ J;
– sig (Dss) ∩ F ⊆ sig (DS0);
– for every i ∈ I , there is j ∈ J such that sig (Di) ∩ sig (DS0) ⊆ sig (D
′
j).
ThenDSα(S0/Sα) is∆–decomposable. If the components {D
′
j}j∈J are pairwise∆–inseparable,
then so are the components of DSα(S0/Sα) in the corresponding decomposition.
Proof. The proof consists of two parts, both of which rely on the constructive definition of pro-
gression for local-effect BAT s from Section 4 and component properties of forgetting discussed in
Section 3. In the first part, we show∆-decomposability ofDSα(S0/Sα) by constructing its compo-
nents explicitly and in the second part we prove that these components are ∆-inseparable.
1) By definition of BAT , for every i ∈ I , we have sig (Di) ∩ F 6= ∅ and thus, from the
conditions of the theorem, sig (Di) ∩ sig (DS0) 6= ∅, sig (Dss) ∩ F = sig (DS0) ∩ F . Hence,
for every i ∈ I there is j ∈ J such that sig (Di) ∩ F ⊆ sig (D′j). Moreover, such j ∈ J is unique
for every i ∈ I , because otherwise there would exist n,m ∈ J , n 6= m, such that sig (D′n) ∩
sig (D′m)∩F 6= ∅, which contradicts the condition that∆2 is fluent-free. Therefore, there is a map
f : I → J such that for every i ∈ I , sig (Di) ∩ F ⊆ sig (D′f(i)). Note that there may exist j ∈ J
such that sig (D′j) ∩ F = ∅ and in this case j is the image of no i ∈ I . Let us denote the image of
f by J˜ (so, J˜ ⊆ J).
Now, for every i ∈ I , consider the set of formulas Di[Ω], the instantiation of Di w.r.t. Ω(S0),
and for each j ∈ J˜ , denote D˜j = [
⋃
i∈f−1(j)(Di[Ω]) ]∪D
′
j . Then, by Proposition 4.2,DSα(S0/Sα)
(progression of DS0 wrt α, with term Sα substituted with S0) is logically equivalent to
[ forget (
⋃
j∈J˜
D˜j , Ω(S0)) ∪
⋃
j∈J\J˜
D′j ] (S0/Sα).
As ∆1 and ∆2 are fluent-free, the signatures {sig (D˜j)}j∈J˜ do not have fluents in common and
thus, by Corollary 3.10, DSα(S0/Sα) is equivalent to
[
⋃
j∈J˜
forget (D˜j , Ω(S0) |j) ∪
⋃
j∈J\J˜
D′j ] (S0/Sα),
where for j ∈ J˜ , Ω(S0) |j is the subset of ground atoms from Ω(S0) with fluents from sig (D′j).
For all j ∈ J \ J˜ , we have sig (D′j) ∩ F = ∅ and D
′
j is uniform in S0, so it follows that S0 6∈
sig (D′j) and thus, DSα(S0/Sα) is equivalent to the union
[
⋃
j∈J˜
forget (D˜j , Ω(S0) |j) ] (S0/Sα) ∪
⋃
j∈J\J˜
D′j.
For every j ∈ J , let D′′j be the set of formulas (forget (D˜j , Ω(S0) |j))(S0/Sα) (in case j ∈ J˜) or
the set of formulas D′j (if j ∈ J \ J˜). So DSα(S0/Sα) is equivalent to
⋃
j∈J D
′′
j . By the definition
of forgetting a set of ground atoms one can assume that sig (D′j) ⊆ sig (D
′′
j ) and sig (D
′′
j ) \
sig (D′j) ⊆ sig (Dss) ∪ {c1, . . . , ck}, for all j ∈ J .
Let us show that [sig (D′′i )∩ sig (D
′′
j )] ⊆ ∆, for all distinct i, j ∈ J . Assume there are distinct
i, j ∈ J such that [sig (D′′i ) ∩ sig (D
′′
j )] \ ∆ = Σ 6= ∅, for a signature Σ. Then do 6∈ Σ, since
both D′′i and D
′′
j are uniform in S0. If there is a single subtheory Dm of Dss, m ∈ I , such that
Σ ⊆ sig (Dm), then the last two conditions of the theorem yieldΣ ⊆ ∆2, which is a contradiction,
because we have assumed Σ ∩∆ = ∅. If there are distinct subtheoriesDm andDn of Dss,m,n ∈
I , such that Σ ⊆ sig (Dm) ∩ sig (Dn), then Σ ⊆ ∆1, and we again arrive at contradiction.
It follows that the pairwise intersection of any signatures from {sig (D′′j )}j∈J is a subset of
∆ and it follows from the second condition of the theorem that sig (D′′j ) \ ∆ 6= ∅. Then {D
′′
j ∪
Taut(∆, j)}j∈J is∆–decomposition of DSα(S0/Sα), where for each j ∈ J , Taut(∆, j) is a set of
tautologies in signature∆ \ sig (D′′j ) which are uniform in S0.
2) Now let us verify that the sets of formulas from {D′′j }j∈J are pairwise ∆–inseparable, if so
are the components of DS0 .
a) First, consider the sets from the union
⋃
j∈J˜
D˜j ∪
⋃
j∈J\J˜
D′j . (‡)
The pairwise intersection of their signatures is contained in ∆ ∪ sig (Sα). We claim that the sets
from this union are pairwise∆–inseparable.
By our definition, for all j ∈ J˜ we have D′j ⊆ D˜j and hence, Cons (D
′
j , ∆) ⊆ Cons (D˜j , ∆),
so let us check that Cons (D˜j , ∆) ⊆ Cons (D′j , ∆) for every j ∈ J˜ . Each formula in Di[Ω], for
i ∈ f−1(j), j ∈ J˜ , has the form
F (c¯, do(A(c1, . . . , ck), S0)) ↔ (ε1 ∧ φ
+) ∨ (F (c¯, S0) ∧ ε2 ∧ φ
−), (∗)
where F is a fluent from sig (D′j), c¯ is a vector of constants from {c1, . . . , ck}, φ
+, φ− are sentences
uniform in S0, and each ε1, ε2 equals true or false (the parameters to summarize different cases of
this formula). This is a definition of ground atom F (c¯, do(A(c1, . . . , ck), S0) via fluents at situation
S0 and situation-independent predicates and functions. Therefore, since ∆ is fluent-free and for all
j ∈ J˜ , D′j is uniform in S0, every model M of D
′
j can be transformed into a model M
′ of D˜j
which agrees with M on ∆. The model M′ is obtained in two steps. First, we expand M with
an arbitrary interpretation of function do and situation-independent predicates and functions from
sig (Di[Ω]) \ sig (D′j) for every i ∈ f
−1(j). Then we continue with this expanded model and
modify the truth value of each fluent F at the interpretation of the tuple 〈c¯, do(A(c1, . . . , ck), S0)〉
according to the obtained truth value of the formula in the definition of F (c¯, do(A(c1, . . . , ck), S0)
above. This gives us the modelM′. Hence, if ϕ ∈ Cons (D˜j , ∆) and ϕ 6∈ Cons (D′j , ∆), then there
is a modelM ofD′j such thatM 6|= ϕ, but thenM
′ |= D˜j andM′ 6|= ϕ, a contradiction. Therefore,
we conclude that for all j ∈ J˜ , Cons (D˜j , ∆) = Cons (D′j , ∆) and, by pairwise∆–inseparability of
the components of DS0 , the sets from the union (‡) are ∆–inseparable.
b) Since ∆ is fluent-free and Ω(S0) consists only of ground atoms with fluents, from Corollary
3.10 we conclude that the sets from the following union are∆–inseparable:
⋃
j∈J˜
forget (D˜j , Ω(S0) |j) ∪
⋃
j∈J\J˜
D′j .
Now we are ready to prove that the sets from {D′′j }j∈J are pairwise ∆–inseparable. For every
j ∈ J˜ , let us denote Gj = forget (D˜j , Ω(S0) |j). We will demonstrate that for every j ∈ J˜ it
holds Cons (Gj(S0/Sα), ∆) = Cons (Gj , ∆), from which the statement follows. First, let us verify
that Cons (Gj (S0/Sα), ∆) ⊆ Cons (Gj , ∆). Assume that for some j ∈ J˜ (we fix this j for the
following) there is a formula ϕ ∈ Cons (Gj(S0/Sα), ∆) and a modelM of Gj such thatM 6|= ϕ,
and arrive at contradiction.
By the syntactic definition of forgetting a ground atom, the term Sα occurs in Gj only in sub-
formulas obtained from the definitions (∗), so let us consider such a definition for a ground atom
F (c¯, Sα) with some fluent F . Let us recall that Gj is the result of forgetting a set of ground atoms
with fluents having S0 as situation argument. Since c¯ is the vector of object arguments in the defini-
tion of F (c¯, Sα) in (∗), we have F (c¯, S0) ∈ Ω(S0) |j . Therefore, ifM |= εF (c¯, S0) (ε denotes the
optional negation in front of atom), then there is a modelM′ |= ¬εF (c¯, S0) such thatM′ ∼σ M,
with σ = F (c¯, S0), and hence, M′ 6|= ϕ (since ∆ is fluent–free) and the truth value of F (c¯, Sα)
in M and M′ is the same. Hence, either in M or M′ the truth values of F (c¯, Sα) and F (c¯, S0)
coincide. The similar argument applies to the whole set of definitions (∗) from D˜j under forgetting
the set Ω(S0) |j . Therefore we may assume that in M or M′, for each fluent F ∈ sig (Gj) the
values of F (c¯, Sα) and F (c¯, S0) coincide. SoM |= Gj(S0/Sα) orM′ |= Gj(S0/Sα) which is a
contradiction, because ϕ holds in neither of these models.
To prove the reverse inclusion Cons (Gj , ∆) ⊆ Cons (Gj(S0/Sα), ∆), observe thatGj(S0/Sα)
is uniform in S0. Hence, by an observation similar to Lemma 2.8, every modelM of Gj(S0/Sα)
can be expanded to a modelM′, where the interpretation of function do is such that the values of
terms Sα and S0 inM′ coincide. ThenM′ |= Gj and thus, there is no formula ϕ ∈ Cons (Gj , ∆)
such that ϕ 6∈ Cons (Gj(S0/Sα), ∆).
We note that a result similar to Theorem 4.5 can be proved in a more general case, for progres-
sion of not-necessarily local-effect BAT s, by considering progression as a set of consequences of
Duna ∪ Dss ∪ DS0 uniform in Sα or using the second-order definition of progression from Theo-
rem 2.10 in [27]. Since both definitions of progression are non-constructive, one would have to deal
with background theories such as Duna, when reasoning about decomposition of the initial theory.
Although it would be possible to define a more general notion of decomposability wrt a background
theory by following this direction, this study would take us too far away from the goals of this paper,
and it would not be illuminating.
The proof of the theorem uses Proposition 4.2 and the component properties of forgetting from
Section 3. The important observation behind this result is that in order to compute progression of
an initial theory wrt an action having effects only on fluents from one decomposition component, it
suffices to compute forgetting only in this component. Given a decomposition of the initial theory
into inseparable components, the rest of the conditions in the theorem are purely syntactical and
easy to check. For example, these conditions would naturally hold if one merges weakly-related
action theories, as illustrated in the running example (continued below). SSAs can be grouped into
|I| components by drawing a graph with fluent names as vertices, and an edge from the fluent on the
left-hand side of each SSA going to each fluent occurring on the right-hand side of the same SSA.
Similarly, it is easy to check the last condition of the Theorem that guarantees alignment of groups
of axioms in SSAs with decomposition components of DS0 .
In the above conditions, observe that if an action A occurs in active position of SSAs from
two different sub-theories of Dss, then computing progression may involve forgetting in two corre-
sponding components of DS0 . This can potentially lead to appearance of new common∆1–symbols
in the components of progression. As a consequence, ∆2–decomposability of progression may be
destroyed, but it is desirable to preserve it. A practically important class of BAT s, for which this
interference can be avoided, is described in the corollary below. Note the first condition in the corol-
lary that every action mentioned in BAT can have effects on fluents only from one component of
Dss. Together with the second condition this guarantees preservation of ∆2-decomposability and
inseparability of the initial theory after progression. The third condition in the corollary guarantees
preservation of all the conditions of Theorem 4.5 for the BAT obtained after progression and thus,
one can compute progression for arbitrary long sequences of actions while preserving decompos-
ability of DSα(S0/Sα) and inseparability of its components.
Corollary 4.6 (Strong preservation of components in local-effect BAT s) In the conditions and
notations of Theorem 4.5, let α = A(c¯) be a ground action term, where c¯ = 〈c1, . . . , ck〉 is a tu-
ple of constants, and let the following conditions hold:
– no action function is in∆1;
– {c1, . . . , ck} ⊆ sig (D′j), for some j ∈ J ,
whenever A is in active position in a SSA for a fluent F ∈ sig (D′j);
– it holds that∆1 ⊆ ∆2.
Then DSα(S0/Sα) is ∆2–decomposable into ∆2–inseparable components. Moreover, all the
conditions of Theorem 4.5 hold for the BAT with the initial theory DSα(S0/Sα) obtained after
progression.
Proof. By the first condition, action A can be in active position of SSAs of a single subtheoryDi of
Dss. Then, due to the componentwise computation of progression shown in the proof of Theorem
4.5, progression can affect the single corresponding componentD′f(i) of DS0 . The second condition
of the corollary guarantees that {c1, . . . , ck} ⊆ sig (D′f(i)) and together with the third condition
this yields that DSα(S0/Sα) is ∆2–decomposable into ∆2–inseparable components, just like DS0
is.
Computing the progression of DS0 wrt α is essentially a syntactic modification of D
′
f(i) which
may introduce signature symbols from context conditions of Di only into D′f(i) and into no other
components of DS0 . Denote byD
′′
f(i) the theory obtained fromD
′
f(i) in this way.
Let us verify that all the conditions of Theorem 4.5 are preserved for the BAT with the initial
theory DSα(S0/Sα) obtained after progression. The first condition of the theorem holds by default.
By the definition of forgetting ground atoms, one can assume that sig (D′f(i)) ⊆ sig (D
′′
f(i)). Since
DSα(S0/Sα) is∆2–decomposable and, by the definition ofDSα(S0/Sα), all the components ofDS0
except D′
f(i) remain unchanged after progression, the second and third conditions of the theorem
hold. To show the last condition suppose the opposite, i.e. there is k ∈ I , for which the condition
does not hold. Then k 6= i, since sig (D′
f(i)) ⊆ sig (D
′′
f(i)), and there is a subsignature Σ ⊆
sig (D′′
f(i)) \ sig (D
′
f(i)) such that Σ ⊆ sig (Dk). By the definition ofD
′′
f(i), we may assume that
Σ ⊆ sig (Di). As DSα(S0/Sα) is a set of formulas uniform in S0, we have do 6∈ Σ and thus, Σ ⊆
∆1 ⊆ ∆2. Let D′j be the component of DS0 , for which the condition sig (Dk) ∩ DS0 ⊆ sig (D
′
j)
holds. Since Σ ⊆ ∆2 and DS0 is ∆2–decomposable, we have Σ ⊆ sig (D
′
j) and thus D
′
j is the
required component forDk, a contradiction.
Example 2 (continuation). Note that theBAT considered in the example satisfies the conditions
of the corollary with fluent-free signatures∆1=∅ and∆2={Block, S0}. The theoryDss is a union
of two theories, with the intersection of signatures equal to {do}. As already noted in the example,
the initial theory DS0 is ∆2–decomposable into ∆2–inseparable components. Now, consider the
ground action α=move(A,B,C). By Corollary 3.10 and Proposition 4.2, in order to compute the
theoryDSα(S0/Sα) (the progression ofDS0 wrt α, with the term Sα substituted with S0), it suffices
to forget the ground atomsOn(A,B, S0) andClear(C, S0) in the first decomposition component of
DS0 and update it with the ground atoms On(A,C, S0) and Clear(B,S0). The second component
of DS0 remains unchanged. One can check that DSα(S0/Sα) is the union of the following theories:
ϕ ∧ ψ ∧ (x 6= C)→ Clear(x, S0)
ψ → Block(x)
Block(B)∧Block(C)∧On(A,C,S0)∧ ¬On(A,B,S0)
Clear(A,S0) ∧Clear(B,S0) ∧ ¬Clear(C, S0)
and
(Top(x, S0) ∨ Inheap(x, S0))→ ¬Block(x)
∃x Block(x),
where ϕ and ψ, respectively, stand for
(x 6= B) ∧ ¬∃y ((y 6= A ∨ x 6= B) ∧On(y, x, S0)),
(x = A) ∨ ∃y ((x 6= A ∨B 6= y) ∧On(x, y, S0)).
The theoryDSα(S0/Sα) is∆2–decomposable by the syntactic form and there is no need to com-
pute a decomposition again after progression. Corollary 4.6 guarantees that the obtained components
are ∆2–inseparable. It is important that in this case we can compute progression for arbitrary long
sequences of actions while preserving both decomposability of DSα(S0/Sα) and inseparability of
its components.
5 Summary and Future Work
We have considered the impact of the theory update operations, such as forgetting and progres-
sion on preserving the component properties of theories, such as decomposability and inseparability.
Forgetting and progression have a “semantic nature”, since the input and the output of these transfor-
mations are related to each other by using restrictions on the classes of models. On the contrary, the
decomposability and inseparability properties are defined using entailment in a particular logic. As
logics (weaker than second-order) may not distinguish the needed classes of models, the conceptual
“distance” between these two kinds of notions is potentially immense. This can be somewhat bridged
by the choice of either an appropriate logic, or appropriate theories in the input. We have identified
conditions that should be imposed on the components of input theories to match these notions more
closely. Also, the Parallel Interpolation Property (PIP) was shown to be a relevant property of logics
in our investigations. The results can be briefly summarized in the tables below. For brevity, we use σ
to denote a signature or a ground atom.We slightly abuse notation and consider σ as a set of symbols
even in the case of a ground atom implying that in the latter case σ consists of the single predicate
symbol from the atom. We assume that the input of operations of forgetting and progression is a
union of theories T1 and T2, with sig (T1) ∩ sig (T2) = ∆, for a signature∆.
Property Condition Result Reference
Preservation of
∆–inseparability
of T1 and T2
under forgetting
σ
σ ∩∆ = ∅ YES Corollary 3.10
σ ⊆ ∆ and σ is a ground
atom NO
Example 4
σ ⊆ ∆ and σ is a signa-
ture
YES,
if logic has PIP
Proposition 3.7
σ ⊆ ∆ and T1, T2 are se-
mantically inseparable YES
Proposition 3.8
Distributivity of
forgetting σ over
union of T1 and
T2
σ ∩∆ = ∅ YES Corollary 3.10
σ ⊆ ∆
NO,
even if T1 and T2 are se-
mantically inseparable
Example 5
T1 and T2 are semanti-
cally inseparable “modulo
σ”
YES
Proposition 3.9
Property Condition Preservation Reference
∆–
inseparability
of compo-
nents of initial
theory under
progression
at least one fluent is present in
∆ NO
Example 7
∆ is fluent-free and some
components of initial theory
split under progression
NO
Example 8
∆ is fluent-free and compo-
nents of initial theory do not
split under progression
YES,
modulo the unique
name assumption
theory
Theorem 4.4
BAT is local–effect, ∆ is
fluent-free and components of
initial theory do not split un-
der progression
YES
Theorem 4.5
∆–
decomposabi-
lity and
preservation
of signature
components
of an initial
theory under
progression
wrt action
term α
Unconditionally, in particular
for local-effect BAT s and
fluent-free∆’s
NO
Example 6
BAT is local–effect, ∆ is
fluent-free, and components of
DS0 are aligned with compo-
nents of Dss
YES,
modulo common sym-
bols of the components
of Dss and constants in
term α
Theorem 4.5
if additionally the constants in
term α are contained in a sin-
gle ∆-decomposition compo-
nent of DS0
YES
Corollary 4.6
The examples and Lemmas given in the paper demonstrate that the sufficient conditions for in-
variance of decomposability and inseparability wrt progression in local-effect action theories cannot
be relaxed. Our research has required new understanding of progression and the related notion of
forgetting wrt modularity of theories. The new results about forgetting are general and may find
applicability outside of reasoning about actions. Given a decomposition of the initial theory into
inseparable components, the rest of the conditions in Theorem 4.5 and Corollary 4.6 are purely syn-
tactical and therefore are easy to check. The important practical observation behind these results is
that in order to compute the progression of an initial theory wrt an action having effects only on flu-
ents from one decomposition component, it suffices to compute forgetting only in this component.
As illustrated by the running example, non-interacting dynamic systems may share only some com-
mon names or static entities, such as location. The fact that the dynamic systems share no fluents can
be obscured by the way they are presented, whereas decomposition would make it explicit. We be-
lieve that our positive results are applicable to a large and general class of basic action theories. The
significant contribution of the paper is in exploring the important connections between research on
modularity and reasoning about action. The paper starts bridging the gap between these two different
research communities in knowledge representation.
There are several directions where future work may proceed. In this paper, we concentrate on
local-effect action theories only. However, recently [7] defined a new broad class of action theories
called bounded situation calculus action theories, in which actions may have non-local, but bounded
effects. Moreover, for these action theories, one can find cases when progression is effectively com-
putable [46]. Therefore, it is natural to explore when decomposability and inseparability remain
invariant wrt progression in bounded action theories. Additionally, we noted that there is a realistic
case of initial theories, for which the size of a progressed theory with local effects does not grow
exponentially. The initial theories of this kind are known as proper+ theories [21,27]. Therefore, it is
worth while to develop computationally tractable techniques for decomposition of proper+ theories.
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